Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a profound geopolitical shift, prompting European governments to reassess their security architectures, both at the national level and within broader frameworks such as NATO and the European Union. For decades, European security has largely depended on NATO and, above all, U.S. leadership. However, the return of Donald Trump to the White House has reignited long-standing doubts about Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor. This has accelerated Europe’s push toward greater strategic autonomy and a more cohesive defence posture.

Amid the fragmentation of the liberal international order and growing geopolitical uncertainty, the EU has responded by placing renewed emphasis on common defence. Member states have significantly increased military spending, while Brussels has launched an ambitious €800 billion initiative—known as “Re-arm Europe” or “Readiness 2030”—to strengthen collective defence and enhance strategic readiness.

It is also increasingly evident that third countries must be involved in shaping Europe’s security future. Among them, Türkiye stands out as a critical strategic actor. A NATO member with a key geostrategic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East, Türkiye has played a direct military role in Ukraine and remains engaged in several European institutional and cooperative mechanisms, despite a long and often contentious EU accession process.

Yet major obstacles remain. Concerns over the erosion of democracy and rule of law in Türkiye continue to complicate its deeper integration into the EU’s security framework. At the same time, the EU’s own institutional inertia, internal divisions, and enlargement fatigue make it difficult to develop a coherent and inclusive strategic approach. In response to these challenges, a new trend is emerging: a preference for selective bilateral partnerships, particularly in defence and security.

Italy has positioned itself as a key player in this evolving landscape. Building on a long history of cooperation with Ankara and a bilateral trade volume now exceeding $32 billion, Rome and Ankara have recently deepened their ties in the defence sector. Baykar Technology, one of Türkiye’s leading drone manufacturers, has acquired the historic Italian firm Piaggio Aerospace. In addition, Baykar has signed a 50/50 joint venture agreement with Leonardo—Italy’s foremost defence company—for the co-production of drones, marking a new chapter in bilateral defence cooperation.

To explore how defence relations between Türkiye, the EU, and Italy are evolving, IstanPol posed a series of questions to six leading experts in the field.

How would you describe the recent developments in Türkiye's EU defence cooperation?

EU-Türkiye defence cooperation is asymmetrical and bilateral. EU Member States like Germany are uncertain about investing in Türkiye, because of perceived risks associated with recent clampdowns on the opposition and the private sector in Türkiye. Poland, Spain, Italy, and other EU Member States, however, continue to see a lot of value in closer cooperation in defence with Türkiye. This is primarily due to shared security concerns linked to Russia as well as the cost-effectiveness of producing and purchasing near-shore defence equipment in Türkiye. Italy is the most recent and successful example of defence cooperation between an EU country and Türkiye, rumoured to be green-lighted and facilitated by the United States. The asymmetrical relationship is based on the fact that the EU, at this current time, cannot integrate Türkiye into the EU’s growing military and defence structures like PESCO and European Defence Agency. This is due to political blocks (veto) linked to the territorial integrity of Cyprus and underlying frictions between Athens, Paris, and Ankara. At this delicate moment in time, it is clear that the EU needs Türkiye for cost-effective production, supply chain proximity and quality, as well as due to Ankara’s important geostrategic position. Likewise, Türkiye does not possess the budgetary spending power that is being unleashed by Germany and the EU for military production. Ankara, despite recent years of development, also continues to lack specific, but very defining, components of high-level technology. It’s clear that pan-European security impacts Türkiye as much as the rest of Europe. The question is whether the main powerholders on the Continent will be able to find common ground or compartmentalize their differences, in order to promote a stronger and more united defence industrial base? The answer to that question lies squarely with Ankara, Paris, and Berlin, but remains in steep competition with Washington and Moscow.

Samuel Doveri Vesterbiyem, Managing Director, European Neighbourhood Council (ENC)

How has the geopolitical context (e.g., Russia-Ukraine war, Eastern Mediterranean tensions) shaped trilateral defence cooperation among Türkiye, Italy, and the EU?

Over the past year, defence cooperation between Italy and Turkey has strengthened with the acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace by Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, which has also recently announced a joint venture with Leonardo — Italy’s largest defence company — to produce unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). While these recent agreements fall within the framework of long-standing bilateral relations centred on economic and commercial ties, there is no doubt that geopolitical developments in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, and the wider Mediterranean have contributed to enhancing Turkey’s role as a partner in the defence sector. This is due not only to Turkey’s strategic position in various geopolitical contexts but also to the rapid expansion of its defence sector in recent years, as evidenced by the growing export of Turkish drones.

Although Italy-Turkey relations are not free from divergences, these do not appear to hinder bilateral defence cooperation, which instead shows strong growth potential. However, it remains to be seen how this bilateral partnership might evolve into a broader European dimension. While Turkey is considered a valuable NATO ally with a key role in the security dynamics of strategically important areas for Europe, from the Balkans to the Black Sea and the Middle East, integrating Ankara into a European security and defence framework would not be a straightforward task.

Valeria Talbot, Head of ISPI’s Middle East and North Africa Centre

Which strategic priorities bring Türkiye and Italy into alignment within the context of Europe’s emerging security architecture? Do you foresee any limitations?

Italy and Türkiye are historically aligned in the Mediterranean basin, sharing the responsibility of maintaining the security and stability of the area. Rome and Ankara converge mainly on regional stabilization, NATO cohesion, energy transit, and migration management; this elevates them as natural partners in a shifting European security landscape. In a highly fragmented and volatile regional context, they aim to strengthen existing synergies by consolidating cooperation, also with a view to extending their influence and strengthening their regional role. Hence, they are called to capitalize on their shared interests and their common NATO commitments.  Italy and Türkiye collaborate extensively in crucial scenarios such as Libya and North Africa, and -despite some occasional divergences- they share a common interest in maritime security and energy diversification. Furthermore, both countries face migratory pressure, and their cooperation includes combating human trafficking and managing flows. Within the evolving European security design, Italy supports a more inclusive approach towards Türkiye as an EU candidate member and key regional actor. The limitations are mainly attributable to the relations between Türkiye and some EU member states, which are often characterized by political frustration and volatility.

Valeria Giannotta, Scientific Director, Turkey Observatory, CESPI

What are the prospects for a more substantial Turkish role in EU defence initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund? Could Türkiye realistically benefit from the EU’s “ReArm Europe” plan?

Türkiye’s growing aerospace capabilities and established defence-industrial base position it as a serious candidate for greater involvement in EU defence initiatives like PESCO and the European Defence Fund. Its dynamic defence R&D ecosystem, ambitious and large-scale programs such as the Kaan 5th-generation fighter, and successful drone exports show that Türkiye can contribute technologically and operationally to support the European defence and security capability boost process. Additionally, Türkiye’s strategic partnership with Italy, highlighted by the latest Baykar–Leonardo UAV joint venture initiative, as well as TUSAŞ Hürjet export to Spain and STM's success in winning a replenishment ship contract from Portugal, shows that Ankara can integrate effectively with the EU-based defence industrial base. However, political considerations remain a significant barrier. Türkiye is not an EU member, and past tensions—especially concerning the rule of law, foreign policy divergence, and arms embargoes—have complicated institutional cooperation. Still, initiatives such as “ReArm Europe” could benefit from Türkiye’s cost-effective manufacturing and battlefield-proven systems, especially as Europe seeks to ramp up defence production and close capability gaps. Realistically, Türkiye stands to benefit from ReArm Europe if channels for structured cooperation are created, emphasizing industrial partnerships and mutual strategic interests over political discord. Leveraging platforms like the Turkish-Italian aerospace model may offer a practical entry point for deeper EU-Türkiye defence collaboration within a more flexible framework.

Arda Mevlütoğlu, Independent Defence Analyst

How do you envision the future of European defence cooperation, and to what extent do you see Türkiye being integrated into this evolving framework?

The role of Turkey in the new defence architecture of Europe has two elements.  The first has to do with its eventual participation in the development of a European defence industry autonomous from that of the US.  The second relates to the role that Turkey’s armed forces, the second biggest in NATO, can play in an eventual peace-keeping operation in Ukraine. In the absence of the perspective of a cease-fire that would need to be monitored by outside forces, it is the first role that exercises minds. According to the regulation (SAFE) adopted by the EU Council on 27 May, only member states of the EU and of the EEA have an automatic right to join in the effort to integrate European defence industries.  Other countries will most likely need to negotiate their participation. In Turkey’s case, this would probably require concessions with respect to Cyprus, the East Mediterranean, etc, that would be unpalatable to any Turkish government. There remains the option of developing joint projects with an EU country. Italy comes to mind in this regard.  However, the existing guidelines require that the non-EU element of the joint project should not exceed 35%, which puts a severe constraint on what is feasible.  But the main problem relates to the lack of mutual confidence between the two sides. In the present circumstances, it is difficult to see how they could engage in a possibly irreversible process of cooperation and integration in the production of sensitive military material.      

Selim Kuneralp, Former Ambassador and Advisory Board Member at IstanPol

How do you think the developments in Turkish domestic politics will impact its capacity to be a part of European defence architecture?

From its onset, Turkey has always defined itself within the European institutions, including the defence-oriented ones. Although Turkey’s search for "strategic autonomy" for almost a decade now -pursuing different security alignments to avoid overdependence on any single bloc– which opened up an active conversation with BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other actors in the world seems to challenge this continuity, most of these endeavours are just domestic talking points. For instance, the Turkish purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which raised eyebrows in the corridors of NATO and EU institutions, was mainly to ease the immense domestic fear the 15 July coup attempt created among the citizens back then. The current proactive Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan’s leadership prospect are very popular among the Turkish citizens, so Turkey will seemingly have its fingers in all pies in the medium term. But this will probably not directly translate into concrete foreign policy steps, and Turkey’s deep-rooted European security perspective is likely to continue, although it is not a well-kept secret that Turkey’s EU candidacy prospect is at a standstill for some time now. Especially after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the potential de-Americanisation of European security during the second Trump administration, Turkey and the EU came to the brink of another defence-related rapprochement, which was severely hampered by the unlawful arrest of the elected Istanbul mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu. Nevertheless, Turkey is still very crucial for the European security architecture but as mentioned, domestic-international is not more strictly intertwined anywhere than in Turkey so if the EU wants to sustain a trust-based relation with Turkey, it could boost the visa liberalisation process with Turkey, which is currently one of the most cumbersome areas for Turkish citizens right now.

Başak Alpan, Associate Professor of Political Science, METU


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This issue review was authored by Riccardo Gasco, with research and editorial assistance provided by Rona Şenol and Emre Ergüder.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the institutional views of IstanPol. The choice of using "Turkey" or "Türkiye" is at the discretion of the contributors.