In 2025, Turkish foreign policy unfolded in a context marked by heightened strategic centrality and persistent political constraints. Rather than a year of radical shifts, it was one of consolidation, in which Ankara sought to manage overlapping crises, expand its diplomatic reach, and translate its growing security relevance into tangible influence across multiple theatres. Türkiye emerged as a pivotal actor in regional security and European defence debates, while continuing to operate within a framework of calibrated pragmatism, selective yet multi-alignment.

The most consequential regional development was the collapse of the Assad regime, which profoundly altered Syria’s political and security landscape. In response, Türkiye moved to consolidate its role as a key power broker, combining military presence, intelligence diplomacy, and engagement with emerging actors, while navigating complex relations with the United States, Russia, and non-state groups. These dynamics intersected with renewed debate over the Kurdish issue at home, as cautious political signals in Ankara carried direct implications for Türkiye’s approach to Syria, the SDF, and regional stability more broadly.

At the same time, Türkiye’s relations with its Western partners reflected a pattern of strategic necessity without political convergence. Under the second Trump administration, relations with the United States remained transactional and volatile, shaped by unresolved disputes over defence cooperation, sanctions, and Syria. In 2025, the European Union saw a renewed focus on pragmatic cooperation in defense, energy security, migration management, and industrial partnerships, even as deeper political alignment and normative convergence remained elusive. Within this evolving European security landscape, Türkiye is increasingly positioned as an indispensable yet external actor, particularly through expanding defence-industrial cooperation with key European partners.

Beyond the transatlantic space, Ankara continued to pursue a multi-aligned foreign policy, maintaining engagement with NATO while exploring alternative diplomatic platforms such as BRICS. This approach aimed to maximise strategic autonomy without fully abandoning established alliances, though it also reinforced ambiguity about Türkiye’s long-term orientation.

Against this backdrop, IstanPol has invited six experts to assess the main trajectories of Turkish foreign policy in 2025, examining how domestic recalibrations, regional transformations, defence and industrial dynamics, and shifting global alignments are shaping Türkiye’s international positioning and its outlook for 2026.

In 2025, Türkiye positioned itself as an increasingly important actor in Europe’s fragmented defence landscape, deepening industrial and strategic ties with Italy and the UK while remaining outside the EU’s formal defence structures. How do you assess Türkiye’s evolving role in the emerging European defence mosaic, and what do these dynamics suggest for Ankara’s long-term place in Europe’s security architecture?

In the past year, Türkiye has reaffirmed its role as a crucial geopolitical player across various realms and scenarios of European interests. Yet, despite a rising defence industry and military capabilities, its role in the latter’s emerging security architecture remains uncertain. On the one hand, agreements, trade, and cooperation in the defence sector with several European countries already suggest Ankara’s de facto contribution to and integration within this area. On the other hand, its limitation to bilateral ties illustrates the lack of a clear, institutionalized framework at the broader European level for addressing diverging political views among member states, the erosion of mutual trust, and bureaucratic barriers. Nonetheless, deepening industrial and strategic ties with Italy and the UK, as well as the repositioning of traditionally sceptical countries like Germany on Eurofighter jets, suggest a new potential dynamic: one in which bilateralism is not necessarily another face of transactionalism, but a possible starting point for creating ad hoc frameworks to facilitate Ankara’s long-term role within Europe’s security architecture. To make this feasible and sustainable, it is crucial to move from constrained pragmatism to political ambition, setting clear conditionalities and overcoming the issue-based approach that has characterized EU-Türkiye relations in recent years.

Samuele C.A. Abrami, Researcher, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

The year 2025 saw renewed functional cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, particularly in the areas of defence, energy, and migration, despite unresolved political conditionality and democratic backsliding. How sustainable is this model of “strategic pragmatism without political convergence,” and what are its implications for the future of Türkiye–EU relations?

In 2025, transactionalism has become the default label for EU-Türkiye relations. Transactional foreign policymaking denotes pragmatic, short-term, interest-driven exchanges and deal-oriented interaction that sidelines normative commitments and long-term institution-building. While the 2016 EU-Türkiye refugee “deal” first normalised this logic, in 2025 it has been reinforced through an expanding web of bilateral bargains and communication channels between Ankara and member states like Germany, Italy, Spain and Hungary. Regional and global dynamics have further propelled this shift: the wars in Gaza and Ukraine and Türkiye’s role as crisis manager and mediator; the EU’s growing interest in defence-industrial cooperation with Türkiye; persistent migratory pressures; and a widening transatlantic rift following Donald Trump’s re-election all push the relationship deeper into a transactional corner.

Purely transactional governance offers short-term crisis control but generates significant vulnerabilities for the EU and Türkiye. Issue-by-issue bargaining, pervasive issue-linkages and frequent recourse to threats create volatility in the relationship, while opaque, elite-driven deals tend to benefit governing executives more than domestic constituencies. Over time, transactionalism erodes political conditionality and the EU’s transformative leverage, marginalises acquis-based approximation and entrenches a high-interdependence/low-socialisation relationship marked by widening normative–political divergence. Because transactional dialogues largely eschew institutionalisation and long-term commitments, a genuine “strategic partnership” between the EU and Türkiye can not materialise. In 2026, both sides need to explore ways out of this purely transactional deadlock by investing in rules-based cooperation, stronger institutionalisation of the relationship and more credible normative commitments as the foundations of any meaningful strategic partnership.

Ebru Turhan, Associate Professor of International Relations at Turkish-German University

Türkiye’s defence industry expanded significantly in 2025, from new drone and aerospace partnerships in Europe to intensified cooperation with the Gulf. At the same time, Türkiye’s military posture in Syria and the Black Sea continued to evolve. How have these developments reshaped Türkiye’s defence ecosystem, and what strategic capabilities or dependencies emerged most clearly over the past year?

In 2025, Türkiye continued to reap the benefits of four decades of strategic investment in its domestic defence industry. Defence exports surged by over 100%, surpassing the $7 billion mark, with orders originating not only from traditional markets in Africa and Asia but increasingly from European states. There is little doubt that Turkish defence manufacturers have achieved a level of competitive maturity that facilitates joint ventures with Western European counterparts for the co-development and joint marketing of sophisticated platforms, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), military aircraft, and armoured vehicles. Beyond immediate fiscal advantages, this evolution toward greater strategic autonomy has bolstered Ankara’s defence diplomacy, enhancing its international leverage and prestige.

However, 2025 also became a year of strategic reckoning, as the inherent limitations of defence industrialization became more apparent. Challenges encountered in acquiring the engine for the Kaan indigenous combat aircraft—and subsequent acknowledgments by high-ranking officials—have moderated public expectations, underscoring that absolute self-sufficiency remains unattainable within a highly integrated global economy. Furthermore, missile and drone exchanges in the Russo-Ukrainian and Iranian-Israeli conflicts have demonstrated a critical asymmetry: even states equipped with the world’s most advanced integrated air and missile defence shields remain vulnerable to low-cost loitering munitions and ballistic missiles, which can be deployed at a fraction of the cost required to intercept them. This strategic deadlock lacks a simple solution and will continue to preoccupy military planners in Türkiye and beyond.

Sıtkı Egeli, Associate Professor of International Relations at İzmir Economy University

Türkiye’s 2025 foreign policy balanced active engagement with NATO, pragmatic cooperation with the EU, and selective participation in BRICS as an associate member. How do you interpret Ankara’s current alignment strategy? Has multi-alignment in 2025 strengthened Türkiye’s diplomatic autonomy, or has it amplified ambiguity about its strategic priorities?

Unlike 20th century Türkiye’s exclusively Western global vocation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s “new Türkiye” has a broader orientation and no longer holds its European affiliation above its Eurasian and Middle Eastern associations. Accordingly, the new Türkiye has many identities, none of them exclusive. As a Middle Eastern country, it is the only Middle Eastern state that is also a Black Sea power. As a European country, it is the only European state that borders Iran. And as a Eurasian country, it is the only state that belongs to NATO.

In the ascent of great power competition and a multi-polar international order, Ankara’s new global vocation and multi-alignment strategy have allowed it to punch above its weight. Türkiye has become a Middle East player between Iran, Israel, and Gulf monarchies. It has deep economic ties with the EU, and its ties with U.S. are facing a renaissance driven by Ankara’s key deliveries to the Trump Administration—i.e., contributing to the end of Syria’s Civil War and the Gaza War. What’s more, despite opposing aims in Syria and Libya, Türkiye still enjoys close energy and trade ties with Russia—and Erdogan with Putin.  This will provide Ankara with a unique role in post-conflict Ukraine between Russia, the U.S., and the EU. However, China—which views the large Uyghur diaspora in Türkiye with great consternation—stands out as the only great power Ankara has been unable to reel in.

Soner Çağaptay, Beyer Family Senior Fellow and Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute 

As the post-Assad transition unfolded in Syria and as Ukraine sought renewed diplomatic channels, Türkiye reasserted itself as a mediator with unique access to both Moscow and Kyiv. How has Russia–Türkiye interaction evolved in 2025, and what does Ankara’s balancing act in the wider Eurasian context reveal about its long-term strategic trajectory?

Türkiye–Russia relations in 2025 have remained anchored in the flexibility, pragmatism and opportunism that have shaped their ties for at least the past decade. For Türkiye, Russia remains a key political and economic partner: bilateral trade reached about $52.6 billion in  2024, with the goal of raising bilateral trade volume to $100 billion under a new roadmap agreement.

Russian gas supplies via TurkStream and Blue Stream continue to underpin Türkiye’s energy security, with pipeline deliveries up year-on-year and playing a central role in Ankara’s position as a regional energy hub.

2025 has also seen the return of Türkiye as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, though Ankara’s role is more constrained compared to 2022, given the US leadership in the negotiation process. While still important, Türkiye’s diplomatic role is more as a facilitator than a full mediator.

Cooperation in the Arctic has emerged as a new frontier, with Ankara adopting a Polar Science Strategy to 2035 and launching the Turkish Polar Data Center — an initiative that depends on engagement with Russia’s Arctic presence.

That said, European and American pressure, sanctions on Moscow, and diversification of Türkiye’s energy sources — including talks with the United States and South Korea on a second nuclear plant at Sinop — are reshaping ties. How these pressures influence the trajectory in 2026 will hinge on their success in limiting a partnership both capitals still seek despite underlying tensions.

Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, Senior Research Fellow at ISPI

The collapse of the Assad regime and Türkiye’s renewed discussion around a Kurdish opening have profoundly altered the regional landscape. How do you envision Ankara recalibrating its Syria policy in 2025, particularly regarding the dynamics of the SDF and HTS, as well as the political implications of the domestic Kurdish initiative?

The past year has marked a turning point for Türkiye’s regional posture. With Iran weakened and the Assad regime fallen, Ankara has emerged as one of the most influential regional actors, wielding significant leverage over Damascus. This shift has alarmed Israel, which views Türkiye’s growing role as the rise of a Sunni-backed axis replacing Iran’s former influence. These concerns have translated into aggressive Israeli military interventions in Syria, threatening to destabilize an already fragile transition.

Ankara, for its part, accuses Israel of exploiting Syria’s security vacuum, including by backing Kurdish forces to undermine Türkiye’s interests. Two dynamics will be decisive in the year ahead. First is whether Israel and Türkiye can pursue broader rapprochement—or, more realistically, reach a limited détente in Syria—potentially enabled by a U.S.-mediated security arrangement between Damascus and Israel. Second, is whether Damascus can make progress integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which continue to control most of Syria’s hydrocarbons and command tens of thousands of fighters.

In March 2025, the SDF agreed to fold its governance and military structures into state institutions, but successive rounds of talks have achieved little progress. Prolonged deadlock raises the risk of escalation. Damascus could attempt to root out the SDF by force. Ankara, which views the SDF as an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is giving Damascus time to negotiate for now. However, if tensions spike or the SDF’s continued autonomy is viewed to be obstructing Türkiye’s own peace process with the PKK, Ankara may not shy away from military intervention, an outcome that would undermine the delicate stability it has helped Syria achieve.

Dareen Khalifa, Senior Advisor at International Crisis Group

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This issue review was authored by Riccardo Gasco, with research and editorial assistance provided by Rona Şenol.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the institutional views of IstanPol.