The year 2024 was marked by a series of critical and consequential developments that reshaped Türkiye’s role on both the regional and global stages. The year began with Ankara’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership in January, a move that strengthened the alliance’s security framework while marking progress in Türkiye’s often-fraught relations with Western partners. In March, Türkiye solidified its position as a global mediator by brokering a high-profile prisoner exchange between Russia and the United States, further underlining its diplomatic leverage.

On the regional front, Ankara adopted a more assertive stance. In May, it suspended trade with Israel in response to escalating violence in Gaza, signaling a strong commitment to the Palestinian cause. Yet, reports of indirect trade through intermediaries raised questions about the extent of this embargo. That same month, President Erdoğan hosted Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Ankara, reviving diplomatic efforts to resolve long-standing disputes with Greece. In September, Türkiye signaled its intent to diversify its alliances by applying to join BRICS, an initiative aimed at enhancing its global influence. Around the same time, Germany lifted its arms embargo on Türkiye, paving the way for renewed defense cooperation, while discussions with the United States on the F-35 program and S-400 missile systems highlighted Türkiye’s ongoing balancing act within the NATO framework.

Domestically, October brought a surprising development when Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli proposed a bold initiative to address the Kurdish issue. His suggestion that Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, which is listed as a terror group by Türkiye, the U.S., and the EU, be allowed to address the parliamentary group of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party as part of an allegedly broader reconciliation effort sparked significant debate. In Syria, Türkiye’s influence became evident as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an offensive on Aleppo with indirect Turkish backing, reshaping the civil war’s trajectory. This culminated in the December collapse of the Assad regime, positioning Türkiye as a key player in shaping Syria’s future.

These events highlight Türkiye’s evolving approach to its foreign policy: maintaining NATO commitments, strengthening regional influence, and diversifying alliances and partnerships. As 2025 unfolds, Türkiye faces the challenge of navigating an increasingly complex international landscape, balancing its regional and domestic ambitions with its role on the global stage. 

To address these complex and consequential events, IstanPol has brought six experts together to provide their opinions on Türkiye’s strategic decision and their lasting impact on foreign policy direction in 2025.

Ankara’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership in 2024 marked a notable shift after months of resistance, raising questions about the broader trajectory of Türkiye-U.S. relations within the NATO framework. Alan Makovsky, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, examines how this development, along with ongoing issues like the F-35 program and Turkey’s S-400 missile systems, has shaped transatlantic ties in 2024 and what challenges and opportunities may lie ahead in 2025:

Turkish ratification of Sweden’s NATO application, followed by U.S. approval of an F-16 sale to Turkey and calm in the Aegean, slowed but did not end the ongoing decline in U.S.-Turkish relations. No progress was made on the two most neuralgic issues: Turkish ownership of S-400s and U.S. support for the SDF/YPG. Fethullah Gülen died, removing a second-tier problem, but the Halkbank sanctions case continued. The last-minute collapse of a reportedly planned Erdoğan visit to Washington in April symbolized ongoing difficulties between the two allies. 

The rocky ride will probably continue in 2025. The x-factor for 2025, of course, is Trump, whom even close advisers find difficult to predict. We know he likes and respects Erdoğan but will readily play hardball with him if he so chooses; including CAATSA implementation, Trump sanctioned Turkey three times in his first term. 

If Syria evolves the way conventional wisdom now has it – with HTS and partners dominating the country under heavy Turkish influence – Ankara’s regional importance will grow, perhaps creating opportunities to cooperate with Washington, but more likely increasing problems with the U.S. Conflict over Washington’s support for the SDF/YPG will likely come to a head; if the U.S. does not withdraw on its own volition, a pro-Ankara government in Damascus could demand withdrawal or otherwise press for unconditional SDF dissolution or disarmament. A new friction point with Israel also may come to the fore if Turkey (on behalf of Damascus) becomes an active advocate for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, an issue long dormant because of the disarray in Syria. Meanwhile, a “good news” story in bilateral relations – the boom in U.S.-Turkish trade in recent years, with the U.S. emerging as Turkey’s number-two export market – would be negatively affected if Trump follows through with a campaign promise to impose a 25% across-the-board tariff on all imports.       

It is difficult to envision a resolution of the S-400/F-35 problem if Turkey remains unwilling to meet the requirement that it relinquish possession of the Russian air defense platform. In any case, Congress may not be willing to sell Turkey the F-35. Many Congressmen are displeased with Erdoğan’s cheerleading for Hamas, including his threat, on one occasion, to attack Israel; some remain unconvinced about the durability of Turkey’s commitment to Aegean calm. 

Alan Makovsky, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress (CAP)

Turkey's evolving security context in 2025 will likely shape its priorities with the EU, focusing on pragmatic cooperation in areas of shared interest. Bahadır Kaleağası, President of the Bosphorus Institute and a member of IstanPol's Advisory Board, highlights that advancements in modernizing the customs union and achieving visa liberalization could become pivotal issues. However, progress will depend on overcoming political and economic challenges, as well as fostering mutual trust and alignment on broader geopolitical goals:

In 2025, the priority for the EU is to address the question of its global competitiveness and policy-making efficiency. Beyond the EU and its core Eurozone, the broader continental geography covered by the European Political Community initiative presents an opportunity for a better institutionalized differentiated integration framework. Given the increasing velocity of transition to the digital age, together with the challenges of the energy transition, financial markets volatility, the extreme populist pressures on the democracies as well as advancements in the R&D for AI, quantum computing, energy fusion, and biotech, the European Union ought to finally think smart and act geostrategically. In this respect, as also asked by BusinessEurope (the Confederation of European Business), a tool of action, among many others, is to launch, without pre-conditions, the process of modernization of the customs union agreement of 1995 with Türkiye. The updated EU-Türkiye relationship may embrace, in addition to, industrial products, services, agriculture, the digital single market, and the green deal. On its side, Türkiye urgently needs to start implementing a structural reform agenda, including the rule of law, education, financial markets, labor policies, and the green transition. By 2026, both parties' geostrategic intelligence will be scrutinized by the progress in these fields.

Bahadır Kaleağası, President of the Bosphorus Institute and Advisory Board Member at IstanPol

Turkey’s formal application for BRICS membership in 2024 underscores Ankara's pursuit of a multi-aligned foreign policy strategy aimed at diversifying its global partnerships but also creating uncertainties about its priorities. Selim Kuneralp, former ambassador and member of  IstanPol's Advisory Board, highlights the pros and cons of Turkey’s BRICS application:

It has never been clearly established that Turkey made a formal application for membership of BRICS, prior to the Kazan summit held on 22-24 October 2024. Questions addressed to the Turkish authorities remained unanswered. The only information about a possible request for accession came from Russian sources.

Nevertheless, there was a heated debate prior to the Kazan summit about the pros and cons of accession. Most observers saw the benefits as limited in view of the fact that BRICS is a forum for discussion rather than a trade-liberalizing instrument.The main economic objective seems to be to foster trade in the currencies of the members rather than in reserve currencies. The political disadvantages related to the fact that as a NATO member country, Turkey’s participation in a forum essentially seen as hostile to the West would create uncertainty about its priorities. One often repeated argument, including by Foreign Minister Fidan, was that Turkey was turning towards BRICS because it felt rejected by the EU.

In the end, the BRICS summit decided not to enlarge the forum. Turkey was given associate status, but there was no indication that this would lead to eventual membership. After the summit the whole question disappeared from the agenda.   

Selim Kuneralp, Former Ambassador and Advisory Board Member at IstanPol

The war in Ukraine has indeed underscored gaps in the EU’s defense and energy frameworks, positioning Turkey as a critical player in addressing these challenges. Çiğdem Nas, Secretary General of Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and Associate Professor of Political Science at Yıldız Technical University, argues that 2025 could see Turkey-EU relations take a more pragmatic turn, driven by mutual strategic interests. Energy cooperation, particularly through Turkey’s role as a transit hub for alternative energy supplies, and defense collaboration within NATO’s framework, may dominate the agenda:

The EU's need to strengthen its defense capabilities, particularly in light of a second Trump administration in the U.S. and the ongoing transition in Syria, may necessitate deeper cooperation with Turkey. Trump's approach to European security and trade policies has exposed vulnerabilities within the EU, while its innovation and competitiveness gap compared to the U.S. and China demands significant economic reforms and internal market improvements. Moreover, accelerating the green and digital agendas is critical.

Amid these challenges, Turkey's economic, industrial, and military capabilities could bolster the EU's resilience. Migration will remain a key issue on the Turkey-EU agenda, particularly regarding cooperation on renewed migratory pressures and the voluntary return of Syrians. However, resolving longstanding disputes—such as the Cyprus issue and concerns over political, democratic, and rule-of-law standards—will likely remain difficult.

Pragmatic and transactional considerations may dominate Turkey-EU relations, with issues like modernizing the Customs Union offering the potential for stronger economic and trade ties. However, even interest-based cooperation will require some alignment on normative principles and the elimination of such obstacles.

Çiğdem Nas, Secretary General of IKV and Associate Professor of Political Science at Yıldız Technical University

The fall of the Assad regime has created a pivotal moment for Turkey’s regional strategy and domestic politics. Turkey’s recent opening toward the Kurds marks a strategic recalibration with significant implications. Erhan Keleşoğlu, Non-Resident Fellow at IstanPol, anticipates that this initiative could potentially enhance Turkey’s influence in shaping Syria’s post-Assad political landscape:

The initiative launched by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli was strategically undertaken in anticipation of forthcoming developments in Syria and the region. Turkey's primary objective is unequivocal: the eradication of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and all associated structures, both domestically and regionally. Especially the state-like entity emerging in northeastern Syria, supported by the United States, is perceived by Turkey as an existential threat. Consequently, Turkey is poised to escalate its pressure on northeastern Syria by utilizing its proxy force, the Syrian National Army (SNA), to confront the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Simultaneously, Turkey is negotiating with Ha’yat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) to coordinate additional pressure on the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has emphasized that a non-negotiable condition for Ankara is the complete withdrawal of PKK cadres from Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the United States has established a buffer zone in Kobani by occupying military bases vacated by Russian forces. The trajectory of these developments is expected to become clearer following Trump’s return to office.

After the Assad regime’s collapse, it is apparent that Erdoğan will seek to capitalize on the resulting power vacuum, particularly in the wake of the withdrawal of Iranian and Russian influence from Syria. On Thursday, December 12, Ibrahim Kalın, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), visited Damascus as part of Ankara’s broader strategy to consolidate and expand its influence in Syria. However, the rise of HTS - which Turkey has approached with caution and strategic distance, unlike its proxy force, the SNA - presents a significant challenge for Ankara. Managing this dynamic is critical, as Turkey seeks to maintain a balance while ensuring its interests are safeguarded. Ultimately, Turkey aims to secure a dominant role in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction, positioning itself to claim the largest share of influence in the region.

Erhan Keleşoğlu, Non-Resident Fellow at IstanPol

The fall of the Assad regime marks a turning point in the Middle East, prompting a realignment of regional and international actors. Pınar Dost, Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, emphasizes that the shifting dynamics are likely to foster new alliances and rivalries as states recalibrate their strategies to fill the power vacuum in Syria:

The rise of a political Islamist group in Syria has reignited U.S. commentary referencing Türkiye’s past support for political Islam, ignoring its post-2022 shift away from sectarian foreign policy. Similarly, claims of an imminent power struggle with GCC states or confrontation with Israel overlook Türkiye’s focus on constructive regional engagement. After experiencing the fallout of isolation, Türkiye aims for stability, engaging neighbors to shape Syria’s future collaboratively.

Despite past turbulence, Türkiye and Israel are poised to benefit from shifting regional dynamics. Türkiye’s issues with the PKK-YPG within the SDF remain central, exacerbated by U.S. support for the SDF and AANES, aimed at countering Iran and serving Israeli interests. Israel, under international law, faces severe allegations regarding its treatment of Palestinians.

Meanwhile, the Iran-led Axis is weakening, benefitting Türkiye and other regional actors but risking power vacuums that extremist elements or Iranian proxies might exploit. Türkiye has been in proxy conflicts with Iran in Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus, with notable escalations in 2022, including attacks on its military bases with casualties.

Looking ahead, Türkiye may balance relations with Israel and the SDF, particularly if the SDF distances itself from the PKK/YPG. A revived Kurdish opening hints at foresight, aligning domestic, regional, and U.S. policy shifts. Türkiye and Israel, despite differences, historically maintain pragmatic ties. Türkiye’s counterterrorism efforts and role in capacity and state-building as well as in reconstruction, akin to its contributions in Africa, signal its readiness to support Syria’s stability and broader regional order.

Pinar Dost, Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council 

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This issue review was authored by Riccardo Gasco, with research and editorial assistance provided by Rona Şenol.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the institutional views of IstanPol. The choice of using "Turkey" or "Türkiye" is at the discretion of the contributors.