Europe’s defense landscape is being redrawn in real time. The shock of the Ukraine war, the return of great-power rivalry, and doubts over U.S. commitment have pushed European states to rearm and invest heavily in their own security. Yet this revival has not produced a single, cohesive system; instead, it has generated a patchwork of overlapping initiatives — NATO’s adaptation to new threats, the EU’s industrial and strategic projects, and a proliferation of bilateral and regional defense clusters. Amid this fluid environment, Türkiye has re-emerged as a pivotal but unconventional player. Despite the persistent freeze in its EU accession process, Ankara has become increasingly embedded in Europe’s security and defense ecosystem through industrial partnerships, supply-chain integration, and shared strategic imperatives shaped by the war in Ukraine. The question is no longer whether Türkiye belongs to Europe’s defense architecture, but rather: how is Europe’s evolving defense ecosystem already being co-shaped by Türkiye — politically, industrially, and geographically?

Europe’s Fragmented Security Order

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only transformed the military balance on Europe’s eastern flank; it has also fractured the institutional and strategic foundations of European security. What had long appeared to be a single architecture built around NATO and the U.S. security umbrella is now evolving into a far more fragmented system. The simultaneous return of Donald Trump to the White House and growing doubts about Washington’s reliability as Europe’s long-term security guarantor have accelerated this process. European governments are rearming at record speed and experimenting with new forms of cooperation. Yet rather than converging on a single center of gravity, Europe’s security landscape is pluralizing.

NATO remains essential, but the European Union has expanded its own initiatives, from the ReArm Europe and Readiness 2030 programs to the European Defense Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). At the same time, a growing number of minilateral formats have emerged: regional clusters such as the Weimar Triangle, the Nordic Defense Cooperation, the Franco-Italian defense axis, and the Baltic and Eastern “frontline” coalitions. The result is a mosaic of overlapping commitments and projects that together constitute a fragmented but increasingly dynamic European defense order. Within this changing ecosystem, third countries, those outside the formal boundaries of the EU, are acquiring new strategic relevance. The United Kingdom, Norway, and Ukraine each play a role in Europe’s security resilience. Yet few partners are as indispensable, and as complex, as Türkiye: a NATO ally with one of Europe’s largest armies, a regional power connecting the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Middle East, and a country whose defense industry has undergone one of the fastest transformations in the world.

Türkiye’s Peripheral Autonomy

Türkiye today occupies a paradoxical position within Europe’s security architecture. On one hand, its relations with the EU remain politically strained and institutionally frozen. On the other hand, Türkiye’s strategic importance to European defense has rarely been greater. This paradox is best understood through what might be labelled as “peripheral autonomy.” The term refers to a mode of strategic behavior whereby a state positioned at the margins of a larger security system seeks to preserve independence while remaining functionally embedded within it—acting as both participant and outsider. As the EU attempts to build strategic autonomy from the United States, Türkiye is pursuing its own version of autonomy within NATO, diversifying alliances, expanding indigenous defense production, and balancing relations with Russia, the Gulf states, and Asia.

Both actors are, in different ways, navigating between dependence and independence. For Ankara, this posture is the outcome of a decade of geopolitical recalibration. The shift toward a more assertive and multi-vector foreign policy,  often described as “strategic autonomy” or “hedging”, has been accompanied by heavy investment in national defence industries. Türkiye’s goal is to ensure operational independence from foreign suppliers while preserving interoperability with NATO standards. This strategy, rooted in the trauma of past arms embargoes, has produced tangible results: the rapid rise of companies such as Baykar, Aselsan, Roketsan, and TUSAŞ, and an export portfolio that now spans more than 170 countries and 7.1 billion dollars.

For Brussels, by contrast, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is a collective but uneven process. It is constrained by national interests, fiscal limits, and institutional inertia. The EU’s rearmament program Readiness 2030 initiative, an €800 billion framework aimed at boosting collective defense capabilities, signals ambition, but implementation remains slow and fragmented. This structural asymmetry shapes the EU–Türkiye defense relationship: Europe seeks autonomy through coordination; Türkiye seeks it through diversification. Yet in practice, both end up contributing to the same phenomenon: a fragmented but interdependent European security ecosystem.

The Emergence of a Euro-Turkish Defense Complex

Despite political friction and the institutional deadlock of Türkiye’s EU accession process, the past five years have witnessed a striking expansion of defense-industrial cooperation between Türkiye and EU member states. The most symbolic example came in 2024, when Baykar Technology, Türkiye’s leading drone manufacturer, acquired the historic Italian aerospace company Piaggio Aerospace, best known for its P.180 Avanti aircraft and its advanced engine technologies. The acquisition was followed by a 50/50 joint venture between Baykar and Leonardo, Italy’s largest defense company, to co-develop next-generation unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This was more than a commercial transaction. It represented the institutionalization of a new industrial corridor linking Türkiye’s fast-moving defense sector with Europe’s capital, know-how, and regulatory infrastructure. The partnership, which had a strong political backing, aligns with Italy’s growing emphasis on a pragmatic, southern-oriented approach to European defense, one that sees Türkiye not as an outsider, but as a functional partner for regional stability, maritime security, and industrial resilience. The Baykar–Leonardo partnership is not an isolated case. In 2023, TUSAŞ (Turkish Aerospace Industries) signed contracts to export its Hürjet advanced jet trainer to Spain, while Turkish defense contractor STM secured a replenishment ship deal with Portugal. Turkish drones have also been acquired or co-produced by several EU and NATO members, including Poland.

Taken together, these developments suggest the gradual emergence of a Euro-Turkish Defense Complex — a transnational network of partnerships, co-production agreements, and supply chains that integrates Türkiye into Europe’s defense-industrial base without formal institutional inclusion. The drivers of this integration are both strategic and economic: for European states, Türkiye offers cost-effective and geographically proximate production capacity, battlefield-proven systems, and a high degree of flexibility in procurement processes; for Türkiye, cooperation with EU countries provides access to advanced components, certification standards, and entry into European supply chains that can expand export markets and enhance technological sophistication. This evolving relationship rests on mutual complementarity. Europe’s defense sector seeks production speed and affordability, while Türkiye’s industry looks for technology transfer, credibility, and sustained integration into the broader European ecosystem.

Defense Industrial Interdependence as the New Strategic Glue

The interplay between industrial interdependence and strategic fragmentation is reshaping Europe’s security architecture. The more the EU seeks autonomy from the United States, the more it must rely on external yet proximate partners like Türkiye to fill capacity gaps. Türkiye’s defense production model, characterized by rapid prototyping, vertical integration, and flexible export policies, aligns well with Europe’s short-term rearmament needs. Drones, armored vehicles, and naval platforms produced in Türkiye can complement EU production cycles, particularly as European manufacturers struggle with cost inflation, labor shortages, and bureaucratic procurement rules.

This evolving cooperation points to a new form of functional autonomy, not based on self-sufficiency, but on resilient interdependence. For the EU, it is a way to diversify suppliers and reduce strategic dependencies on the U.S. or China. For Türkiye, it is a means of anchoring its defense industry in Western markets without surrendering its independent posture. The result is a pragmatic convergence. Even as political relations remain difficult, industrial and technological integration deepens quietly, driven by private sector dynamics and strategic necessity rather than institutional design. This bottom-up process may, over time, prove more durable than top-down alignment.

Strategic Geography: The Peripheral Integration of Security

The geography of European security is also shifting. The EU’s “strategic neighborhood” has expanded to encompass a belt of states that are neither inside nor fully outside its security architecture. The United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine, and Türkiye all form part of this peripheral integration zone, where security is shared but asymmetric. These states contribute military capabilities, intelligence, logistics, and industrial production that directly affect Europe’s strategic posture, yet they remain excluded from decision-making in Brussels.

Türkiye’s role within this geography is particularly distinct: in the Black Sea, Ankara’s control over the Straits under the Montreux Convention grants it significant leverage over maritime access and NATO logistics; in the Eastern Mediterranean, its naval and energy policies intersect directly with EU interests related to migration management, maritime routes, and offshore resources; and in the Middle East and North Africa, Türkiye’s military presence in Libya, Iraq, and Syria actively shapes the security environment of Europe’s southern flank. These operational realities make Türkiye not a peripheral actor but a strategic hinge linking Europe’s multiple security theatres. The EU’s ability to act autonomously therefore, depends not only on internal coordination but also on the external stability and reliability of partners like Türkiye.

Constraints and Contradictions

Yet this emerging Euro-Turkish defense complex is far from frictionless, as several political, legal, and structural constraints continue to hinder deeper cooperation. Türkiye remains excluded from the EU’s formal defense mechanisms, such as PESCO and the European Defense Agency, primarily due to the Cyprus veto and unresolved maritime disputes. European concerns over democratic backsliding, the rule of law, and foreign policy divergence continue to erode strategic trust and limit enthusiasm for deeper integration.

At the same time, however, recent policy shifts in some member states reveal a more pragmatic undercurrent. Germany, which had imposed a partial arms ban on Türkiye in 2019 following Ankara’s military operation in northern Syria, has since relaxed its stance, approving €103 million in military exports in 2024—the highest level since 2011—and effectively ending the embargo. Likewise, Sweden lifted its arms embargo in September 2022 as part of its own NATO accession process, and a May 2025 report by the Swedish export authority recorded only two denied applications for military sales, indicating that no broad restrictions remain in place.

These examples show that while political reservations persist, economic and strategic considerations are encouraging selective re-engagement with Türkiye’s defense sector. Nonetheless, deeper structural barriers remain: EU defense funding instruments cap non-member participation at 35 percent of project value, limiting Türkiye’s role in large-scale initiatives, while many EU capitals remain strategically cautious, wary of political volatility and divergent positions on Russia or the Middle East. As a result, cooperation continues mainly through bilateral channels—most notably with Italy, Spain, and occasionally Poland—rather than through Brussels-led frameworks. This bottom-up mode of engagement has proven flexible and pragmatic, but without an overarching political framework, it risks entrenching parallel structures that sustain short-term cooperation yet fall short of long-term strategic coherence.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The contrast between political hesitation and industrial pragmatism lies at the heart of EU–Türkiye defense relations. From a political perspective, Türkiye’s exclusion appears consistent with the EU’s cautious enlargement approach and its enduring emphasis on democratic standards and the rule of law. Yet from an industrial and operational standpoint, this exclusion is counterproductive. Europe’s rearmament agenda requires a rapid expansion of production capacity, and Türkiye represents one of the few proximate ecosystems capable of delivering affordable, battle-tested systems at scale. Moreover, as European defense companies globalize their supply chains, Türkiye’s role as a near-shore manufacturing hub becomes an asset rather than a liability. Cooperation in dual-use technologies, maintenance, and logistics could strengthen Europe’s resilience, particularly amid global supply disruptions and energy dependencies. In this sense, the industrial logic of cooperation is outpacing the political logic of separation. Over time, this may generate a slow but irreversible form of integration — functional, transactional, and interest-driven.

The challenge now is to channel this bottom-up interdependence into a more structured and transparent framework that can sustain cooperation beyond ad hoc arrangements. Rather than relying solely on bilateral deals, both sides could explore pragmatic mechanisms such as a Euro-Turkish Defence and Security Dialogue to coordinate industrial standards, technology transfer, and joint research priorities, or sectoral inclusion of Turkish firms within the Readiness2030framework under clear regulatory conditions. Operational coordination in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea — particularly in EU maritime missions, border management, and hybrid-threat resilience — would further enhance mutual trust, while joint innovation projects in emerging fields such as drones, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare could provide tangible platforms for collaboration.

However, the EU’s reluctance to advance in this direction stems not only from institutional or regulatory limits but also from political ones: persistent concerns about democratic backsliding, judicial independence, and foreign policy unpredictability continue to undermine confidence in Türkiye as a long-term partner. Addressing these structural issues would not only ease the political resistance within the EU but also strengthen Türkiye’s credibility as a reliable contributor to European security. In parallel, Brussels should recognize that strategic interdependence with Türkiye can coexist with political divergence, provided cooperation is guided by predictability, transparency, and shared interests. The future of European security will not be shaped by a single institutional model but by the interaction of overlapping military, industrial, technological, and diplomatic networks.

Within this evolving ecosystem, Türkiye occupies a unique position: not fully inside nor entirely outside Europe’s defense system, but situated at its functional periphery, where cooperation, competition, and interdependence converge. As the EU strives for strategic autonomy and Türkiye consolidates its national defense capabilities, their paths increasingly intersect. The Baykar–Leonardo partnership is emblematic of this pragmatic convergence, showing that resilience in a fragmented security environment arises from interconnected autonomy rather than isolation. The task ahead is to give this convergence institutional form. Without structured dialogue and parallel reforms on both sides, the Euro-Turkish defense complex risks remaining an uncoordinated patchwork driven by market dynamics and short-term necessity. With sustained political will, democratic credibility, and strategic foresight, however, it could evolve into a cornerstone of a more plural and adaptive European security order, one in which Türkiye is not only an indispensable industrial partner but also a politically trusted one.

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Riccardo Gasco is the Foreign Policy Program Coordinator at IstanPol Institute. He is also a political analyst and PhD Researcher in International Relations at the University of Bologna. Based in Istanbul since 2019, he is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), where he works on Turkish foreign policy. He previously held a visiting fellowship at Sabancı University.

IstanPol thanks Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Türkiye Office for their contribution to this project. The views stated in this paper belong to the author and need not agree, partly or entirely, with the institutional views of IstanPol or Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.