Trump’s return to the White House will have profound implications not only for the future of American politics but also for the liberal democratic order—or what remains of it. Over the next four years, Washington’s stance on the war in Ukraine, its commitment to NATO, and its approach to economic competition with China will shape transatlantic cooperation under the Trump administration. As a NATO member and a major trade partner of the European Union, Türkiye will not be isolated from this turbulence. Trump’s reelection might create a window of opportunity for Türkiye, prompting EU countries to reassess their stance and consider integrating the country into the EU security architecture, enhancing economic partnership. Whether Türkiye and its European allies can recalibrate their policies and find common ground for cooperation remains an open question.

 President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at European Political Community Summit in Budapest, Nov. 7, 2024. (Source: AA)

The U.S. Steps Back: Easing the Economic Burden of Global Policing

It is too soon to say how Trump’s second term will differ from his first. However, based on his previous positions and the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 report—widely seen as a blueprint for the President-elect’s agenda—two major pillars stand out in his foreign policy: the 'America First' principle and economic protectionism. The 'America First' approach emphasizes a necessary shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities. Advocates argue that Washington should strategically focus its resources and that the U.S. should not solely bear the economic burden of defending Europe; instead, European allies should contribute more to burden-sharing. In his second term, Trump is expected to increase pressure on allies that fail to meet their defense spending commitments, potentially even threatening to remove them from the NATO defense umbrella. For European countries, a major concern is that Trump could take steps that would weaken NATO’s Article 5, thereby undermining the alliance’s deterrence.

Concerns over Trump’s potential re-election—particularly the risk of cutting off aid to Ukraine or weakening NATO—have long been pushing European states to “Trump-proof” their defense strategies. Many have now met or exceeded the 2 percent defense spending threshold they had long pledged but previously failed to fulfill. They are also working to strengthen NATO’s European pillar and ensure sustained support for Ukraine. At the same time, the EU is continuing to build its autonomous defense capabilities to reduce its dependence on the United States. With rising geopolitical risks, there is a conducive environment for non-EU NATO countries like the UK and Türkiye to engage more actively in European defense. With the ascent of the Labour Party to power in the UK, the UK-EU reset—a key foreign policy goal of the Labour Party—seems to be underway. While the EU views the UK, which is identified as a “like-minded” country in the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), as a favorable partner for collaboration in defense and security, the same cannot be said for Türkiye due to longstanding political issues and strategic differences that complicate deeper cooperation.

Notwithstanding its geopolitical significance and military strength, Türkiye is excluded from defense projects that could enhance the EU’s security and support for Ukraine. For example, having failed to produce the one million 155mm artillery shells it had pledged to supply to Ukraine by March 2024 using the capabilities of its member states, the EU had to turn to non-EU sources. Three EU member states—Greece, Cyprus, and France—vetoed Ukraine’s request to purchase Bayraktar TB2 drones and artillery shells from Türkiye with EU funds. Given its capacity limitations, integrating the UK and Türkiye into the European defense structure would benefit the EU, as both countries are significant military powers positioned on Europe’s opposite flanks. However, Ankara has not received a response to its 2021 application to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), unlike the UK, which was invited to participate in this project in 2022 but chose to contribute on a case-by-case basis.

The negative trajectory of Türkiye-EU relations has hindered Türkiye's efforts to participate in the EU's defense mechanisms. Beyond the political vetoes of certain member states, a deeper issue of mistrust undermines the relationship. Over the past two decades, Türkiye’s drift away from the Copenhagen criteria and its pursuit of an 'autonomous foreign policy,' marked by closer ties with Russia and China, have led to questions about its alignment with the West. From Ankara’s standpoint, the EU's perceived bias in favor of Greece and Cyprus has pushed Türkiye closer to Russia and China, creating a vicious cycle that deepens the EU’s mistrust. Either way, the EU’s perception of Türkiye has deteriorated to the point where Türkiye is now seen as a rival to the EU’s strategic goals—a deadlock detrimental to both parties.

Economic Protectionism & China

Another issue central to Trump’s second term is addressing economic competition with China. During his campaign, Trump pledged to impose tariffs of 60 percent on all Chinese imports and 10-20 percent on all U.S. imports. These proposed tariffs, presented as corrective measures for trade imbalances and protection for U.S. industries, could, if enacted, profoundly reshape international trade dynamics and supply chains, with significant implications for the EU and Türkiye.

In confronting economic competition with China, a Trump-led U.S. would likely pursue an economic decoupling strategy to reduce dependency on China by shifting supply chains elsewhere, ideally back to the U.S. Additionally, the administration would likely continue restricting U.S. investment in China. Trump would also press his European allies to form a unified stance against China.

EU countries hold different views on how to respond to China’s growing economic influence and assertiveness. On the one hand, Europeans are concerned about China’s support for the Kremlin’s war efforts in Ukraine, its human rights violations, and the challenges it poses to Taiwan and other Asian nations. Europeans also worry that China’s industrial overcapacity could lead to an influx of cheap, state-subsidized imports, potentially undermining EU domestic industries, particularly if China’s trade with the U.S. is directed toward Europe. While the EU is reluctant to become entangled in a trade war between the U.S. and China, Brussels may eventually align more closely with Washington, even as it strives to balance member states' interests with the need for a unified response to China’s assertive policies.

Ideally, Ankara could play a pivotal role in the West’s strategy to counterbalance China, particularly in Africa and Central Asia, where it has significant political and economic clout. The Türkiye-Germany Business Council has recently been revived to develop joint investments in third countries in Africa, where Türkiye competes with China for influence. Germany is known for its resistance in the EU to using coercive economic measures vis-a-vis China. Similarly, Türkiye’s Middle Corridor Initiative—an expanding trade route from the Black Sea and Türkiye’s eastern provinces to Central Asia via the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea—facilitates two-way trade flows, thus offering EU countries access to alternative markets, helping to contain China.

However, Ankara’s multi-alignment strategy creates challenges in coordinating policies with its Western partners toward a rising China, as it continues to explore areas of cooperation with Beijing. Türkiye’s bilateral relations with China were elevated to the level of “strategic cooperation” in 2010, followed by Türkiye’s inclusion in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015. In fact, China’s foreign direct investment in Türkiye remains significantly lower than that of European investment. Likewise, Türkiye has a substantial trade imbalance with China, making its commercial ties with the West far more consequential. Nonetheless, there is strong anticipation in Ankara that engagement with China could offer Türkiye advantages and resources to accelerate its economic development, which explains Ankara’s rationale behind its recent BRICS membership bid.[1]

Türkiye-China relations have been on an upward trajectory in 2024. In February, Türk Telekom and Chinese giant Huawei signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to collaborate on the development of the fifth-generation technology standard for broadband cellular networks (5G) in Türkiye. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar visited Beijing in May to discuss nuclear and renewable energy, mining, and minerals. The two countries also signed an MoU on energy cooperation, a significant step as Türkiye seeks China’s involvement in constructing its third nuclear power plant. In July, China’s largest electric car maker, BYD, announced an investment of one billion USD in a new plant in Türkiye to produce 150,000 electric and hybrid vehicles annually. The investment will provide Chinese access to European markets tariff-free. This announcement came as the U.S. and the European Union heightened trade barriers against China. Interestingly, before this deal, shortly after Foreign Minister Fidan visited China in June, Türkiye imposed a 40 percent tariff on cheap Chinese electric cars to protect domestic automakers—a move that appeared more like a zigzag than a balancing act.

Türkiye seeks closer ties with China not only to attract investment but also to enhance trade routes such as the Middle Corridor. This trade corridor could capture 20 percent of the containerized land trade between China and the EU, and stronger ties with Beijing are seen as key to boosting the project's prospects. In contrast, Ankara perceives the EU and U.S. support for the India-Middle East trade route, which bypasses Türkiye and offers an alternative to the Middle Corridor, as an attempt to sideline the country.

Brussels’ recalibration of its China policy on a realistic basis could open up new avenues for cooperation between Türkiye and the EU. Türkiye’s geopolitical position and its balanced relations with China could serve as a strategic asset. However, Türkiye’s application for BRICS membership and its interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization raise concerns among Western allies regarding Türkiye’s priorities and geopolitical orientation.

The Way Forward

Doubts about Türkiye’s strategic alignment continue to strain its cooperation with Western allies in various areas. Nevertheless, there is potential for cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, especially amid growing uncertainty and turbulence in transatlantic relations. Even if Trump does not actively seek to weaken NATO’s deterrence, the trend of the U.S. reducing its commitment to European defense is likely to persist. This shift may prompt some EU countries to reconsider their stance on Türkiye. Germany’s decision to lift its objection to Eurofighter jet sales to Türkiye reflects this evolving perspective and could pave the way for bilateral security agreements between Türkiye and consortium member states (Germany, UK, Italy, and Spain). However, this development does not ensure a similar shift within the EU as a whole. At the end of the day, Türkiye’s exclusion from Europe’s autonomous defense mechanisms not only increases Türkiye's vulnerability but also exposes the EU to risks stemming from its own capacity limitations.

While Türkiye justifies its foreign policy balancing act with shifting global power dynamics, it risks exclusion from both sides. The ambiguity surrounding Türkiye’s bid for BRICS membership—which remains uncertain and is reportedly blocked by India—is a cautionary tale. Therefore, Turkish policymakers should also reflect on where the country’s core interests lie and how best to pursue them.

Closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU could enable to navigate the transition to a multipolar world order increasingly shaped by anti-globalist and protectionist tendencies. However, for cooperation to be rekindled, the EU needs to reassess its approach to Türkiye in light of shifting priorities and threats. Engaging with Türkiye in a way that addresses mutual security and economic interests could encourage its realignment with the West. In turn, Türkiye must take concrete steps to improve its negative image and restore trust. The alternative to cooperation would be for each side to pursue its goals through bilateral arrangements—a path that could lead to further fragmentation in transatlantic relations.

[1] In 2022 Chinese foreign direct investment in Türkiye stood at $1.7 billion.

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Dr. Selin Nasi is a Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at EDAM in Istanbul. Her research interests focus on the EU-Türkiye-UK Triangulation, the role of “middle powers” in the Middle East, Turkish-Israeli relations, and cross-border conflicts.

IstanPol thanks Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Türkiye Office for their contribution to this project. The views stated in this paper belong to the author and need not agree, partly or entirely, with the institutional views of IstanPol or Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.