The NATO Summit in Ankara comes at a moment of strategic recalibration for the Alliance. More than four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s agenda is no longer defined only by the defence of its eastern flank. The war has returned deterrence and collective defence to the centre of European security, but it has also exposed the increasingly interconnected nature of the Alliance’s challenges. The Black Sea, the Middle East, the Gulf, North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, defence-industrial cooperation, and the future of the United States’ role in European security are no longer separate files. They are part of the same wider debate on how NATO should adapt to a more fragmented and contested international order. Türkiye is central to this conversation, but not simply because the upcoming Summit will be held in Ankara. Its importance lies in the fact that many of NATO’s most pressing strategic questions intersect directly with Türkiye’s national interest: in the Black Sea, for example, Türkiye must contend with both being a NATO ally and a pivotal actor in managing the balance between deterrence, support for Ukraine, and escalation control with Russia. In the Middle East, its position as a neighbour of Iran and an actor deeply involved in regional diplomacy shapes the Alliance’s room for manoeuvre.

However, across the Gulf, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye’s regional activism doesn't always intersect with NATO’s broader concern for its southern neighbourhood, highlighting deep tensions among Allied Countries. At the same time, Ankara 2026 takes place in a political context that may create favourable conditions for Türkiye’s position within the Alliance, especially given the Trump–Erdoğan dynamic and renewed debates on burden sharing. Yet such windows of opportunity may be temporary. This edited piece therefore asks how NATO’s agenda should be understood through the multiple theatres in which Türkiye is relevant, while also examining the limits, risks, and uncertainties that continue to shape Türkiye’s role within the Alliance.

After more than four years of full-scale war in Ukraine, what should NATO’s priorities be in dealing with Russia and supporting Kyiv, and how should Türkiye’s role between deterrence, diplomacy, and Black Sea security be assessed?

In strategic terms, much more effort needs to be put into compelling Russia to come to the negotiating table. Allied nations have so far greatly enabled Ukraine to withstand and resist the Russian advance, but self-deterrence on the NATO side has also been a defining factor. On the eve of, and during the early months of, the full-scale invasion, the credibility of NATO, particularly that of US deterrence, was undermined by self-restraint and self-imposed red lines. For the war to conclude, this approach needs to shift towards fully enabling Ukraine to strategically degrade Russia - in line with Ukraine's concept of Russia's strategic neutralisation. Türkiye's role in allied efforts has been crucial. Its closure of the Straits to the Russian navy, enhanced defence cooperation with Ukraine, facilitation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022–2023, as well as its contribution to NATO's strengthened defence and deterrence posture in the Black Sea, have been important pillars. Türkiye's role in containing Russia has been fundamental, and addressing the vulnerabilities and loopholes that the Kremlin readily exploits in Ankara's approach not to directly confront Russia would make a significant contribution to Türkiye’s and Allied security, as well as the regional order in the Black Sea.

Maryna Vorotnyuk, Senior Fellow, Royal United Servies Institute (RUSI)

How should NATO approach Iran and the risk of wider regional escalation in the Middle East, and how does Türkiye’s position as both a NATO ally and a regional neighbour shape the Alliance’s room for manoeuvre?

The US-Israeli war on Iran further exposed a longstanding divide within NATO. Despite Washington launching the war without prior consulting the Alliance, NATO was dragged in: from intercepting Iranian missiles over Turkish airspace, to managing the aftermath of an attack to a U.K. base in Cyprus and having to withdraw forces from Iraq. This fracture highlighted a longstanding crack among Allied countries: European members and the US continue to disagree over how the Alliance should position itself toward Iran, rendering any collective posture beyond Article 5 deterrence practically unattainable. Neither the ceasefire nor the Islamabad memorandum resolved this underlying tension. Türkiye's position encapsulates the Alliance’s dilemma. In March, Ankara allowed NATO to install air defences in its territory while simultaneously attempting to mediate between Washington and Tehran. Türkiye is in a particularly vulnerable place at the moment: Israeli revisionism and a newly emboldened Iran present difficult choices which demand a carefully calibrated response. In this context, NATO membership becomes a leverage against regional security threats without being seen as an  extension of the Alliance allowing Ankara to advocate closer relations between NATO Türkiye-aligned countries in the region. The Ankara Summit, like the 2004 one in İstanbul, offers an opportunity to formalize outreach to like-minded regional states without overextending NATO’s mandate. The Alliance cannot project power into the Middle East. It can, however, avoid fracturing it where Türkiye sits at a pivotal place for an albeit small but not insignificant ambition.

Meliha Altunışık, Professor of International Relations, Middle East Technical University (METU)

How should NATO rethink the connection between European security, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean at a time when instability across the southern neighbourhood is becoming increasingly relevant to the Alliance?

NATO has come a long way since its military intervention in Libya in 2011 which was instrumental toward reaching the objective of European elites who viewed Colonel Gaddafi as no longer useful and a threat to their national security. NATO’s objective – led primarily by a Franco – British initiative with US support – was to “protect the Libyan people” from grave human rights violations led by Gaddafi forces. This optimism, however, was short-lived: what came after was a clear example of a failed state-building stabilization plan despite the abundant resources at the Allied Nations’ disposal. This highlighted NATO’s inability to pursue initiatives which go beyond the scope of its Founding Charter and are therefore outside NATO’s primary objectives, limiting NATO’s operations in and for the North Africa region. NATO still retains leverage in North Africa. In Libya in particular, NATO can adopt the “carrot and stick” approach to extract concessions from the ruling elite and pave the way for the adoption of well-organized and inclusive diplomatic and political initiatives. Powers external to NATO – such as Egypt and Pakistan – should act as mediators only when necessary. Ultimately, the goal should be to strengthen local state institutions so they can drive long-term development and lead peacemaking efforts themselves. Recent experience has shown that soft power alone lacks sufficient leverage when not backed by credible hard power. This is where NATO can once again play a meaningful role: not by replacing civilian efforts, but by providing the security framework that enables them to succeed.

Karim Mezran, Director of North Africa, Atlantic Council

How do Gulf countries view NATO’s role in the Middle East, and how might Türkiye’s renewed engagement with the GCC affect broader discussions on regional security, defence cooperation, and strategic autonomy?

For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), NATO increasingly functions as a framework for practical security cooperation, institutional capacity building, and interoperability through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Within this framework, Gulf partners engage with NATO on cyber defence, maritime security, education and training, crisis management, and civil emergency planning. These tools complement—rather than replace—the GCC’s U.S.-led security architecture and fit within its broader strategy of diversifying security partnerships. The ICI’s flexibility is one of its key strengths, allowing cooperation to evolve according to national priorities rather than a single regional template.

Türkiye occupies a different niche within this architecture. Since its post-Arab Spring rapprochement, its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman have evolved into broad defence-industrial partnerships covering UAVs, naval platforms, electronics, armoured vehicles and selective technology transfer. For GCC states, Türkiye offers something distinct from both NATO and traditional Western suppliers: a sovereign defence partner embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system, yet increasingly able to deliver indigenous and combat-tested platforms.

Yet Ankara and the GCC are currently pursuing different strategic priorities. As host of the 2026 NATO Summit, Türkiye seeks to reinforce its position within the evolving Euro-Atlantic defence architecture, ease remaining defence-industrial restrictions, and demonstrate that European security cannot be separated from developments across NATO's Southern Neighbourhood. 

The GCC, by contrast, remains primarily focused on preventing another escalation with Iran, protecting critical energy infrastructure and maritime chokepoints, and preserving Gulf-based diplomatic channels between Washington and Tehran. The Ankara Summit is therefore less likely to produce a renewed NATO-GCC security framework than to strengthen an existing network of overlapping partnerships. For Ankara, the summit offers an opportunity to connect European security debates more closely with the strategic realities of the Gulf and the wider Middle East through both the official agenda and its accompanying side events.

Özge Genç, Visiting Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs 

How should we understand the Trump–Erdoğan–NATO triangle, and what risks could emerge if today’s favourable conditions for Türkiye prove temporary?

For years, concerned voices in Washington described Türkiye as a fundamental threat to NATO, with some even suggesting it should be “kicked out,” though the mechanisms were always unclear. In reality, the greater threat to NATO was never Turkish obstructionism, but the rise of an isolationist current in US politics that found its clearest expression in Donald Trump. The uncomfortable question for NATO allies is now simple: what is NATO if its most powerful member is no longer firmly committed, and can no longer be relied upon as a deterrent in moments of crisis? Without a credible US commitment, NATO risks entering terminal decline. For Türkiye, this creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities. Ankara has enjoyed a number of short-term successes, some due to its own strategic vision, others because regional rivals have made costly mistakes. It is more integrated into its region than at any time since the Arab uprisings, and relations with Washington have rarely been warmer, largely because of the personal chemistry between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump. Yet the weakening of NATO also diminishes one of Türkiye’s key assets: its role as both a neighbour and representative of the West in the Middle East. More seriously, it raises doubts about whether Europe’s emerging security structures can include a Türkiye moving further into authoritarianism. Ad hoc cooperation will continue, but structural integration remains uncertain. Türkiye may have new room for manoeuvre in a multipolar world, but its vulnerabilities, especially toward Russia, remain stark.

Howard Eissenstat, Laurentian Professor of Middle East History, St. Lawrence University; Visiting Researcher, IstanPol

In a context of growing great power competition and renewed pressure on Europe to strengthen its defence-industrial base, what role can Türkiye play in NATO–EU defence cooperation, and what political or institutional obstacles could limit this potential?

Since the 1990s, NATO has consistently framed EU efforts in security and defence not as a rival project, but as a means of strengthening the Alliance’s European pillar. In the current context, with the Trump administration maintaining reservations about US burden-sharing in European security, this institutional logic has gained new urgency. Yet the EU’s capacity to build that credible European pillar depends, in practice, on the commitment of its two most significant European NATO allies that sit outside the Union: the UK and Türkiye. Without their operational weight, neither European strategic autonomy nor a more balanced Transatlantic burden-sharing arrangement is fully achievable. The UK has already formalised this role through a security partnership with the EU, a deal Türkiye has not yet been able to secure. However, Türkiye could contribute to the mechanisms Europe seeks to build along three principal dimensions: its NATO command experience, its strategic position on the southern flank and the Black Sea, which extends the Alliance's reach into regions where most EU member states have limited presence, and, industrially, its expanding defence sector, particularly in unmanned systems, which offers production capacity at a moment when European industry faces real capacity constraints. What blocks such an agreement is twofold: From a rationalist perspective, the primary obstacle lies with individual member states, principally Cyprus and Greece. From a more idealist perspective, concerns over Türkiye’s alignment with the EU's fundamental values present a further obstacle, irrespective of its strategic utility.

Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, Professor of International Relations, Kadir Has University

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This issue review was co-edited by Alissa Pavia and Riccardo Gasco, with research and editorial assistance provided by Rona Şenol.

IstanPol thanks Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Türkiye Office for their contribution to the publication of this report. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the institutional views of IstanPol or Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.