Armenia held parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, in which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party secured another electoral victory. The elections took place at a time of geopolitical transformations and are likely to have significant implications for Armenia's future domestic and foreign policy. This analysis examines the results of the election and their broader geopolitical implications, focusing particularly on Armenia's peace initiatives with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and its efforts to diversify its international partnerships. Central to this analysis is a question that will remain relevant well beyond the immediate results: what does a weakened but still decisive mandate for Pashinyan mean for the pace of Armenia's rapprochement with Türkiye, and for the wider geopolitical realignment? This analysis returns to that question in its conclusion, which considers whether Armenia's parallel diplomatic openings amount to a durable strategic reorientation or merely one difficult transition ahead of the next.

Election Results

Nineteen political parties and electoral alliances contested the parliamentary elections. The strongest contender was the ruling Civil Contract Party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The 2026 election marked Pashinyan's third major national electoral test. His first came in 2018, when the Velvet Revolution brought him to power and the My Step Alliance, led by Civil Contract, secured nearly 70 percent of the vote in snap parliamentary elections, with voter turnout reaching 48.7 percent. The second followed Armenia's defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Despite widespread criticism over the outcome of the conflict, Pashinyan again secured a decisive victory in the 2021 snap elections, winning 54 percent of the vote with a turnout of 49.4 percent.

Unlike the previous two contests, the 2026 elections were held according to the regular electoral timetable rather than being triggered by a political crisis. Voter turnout reached 59 percent, the highest level since 2011. Civil Contract received 49.82 percent of the vote and secured 64 parliamentary seats. Although this represented another comfortable victory, it was the party's weakest electoral performance since coming to power in 2018.

Pashinyan's campaign centered on the concept of "Real Armenia," a political narrative that argues Armenia must adapt to the geopolitical realities created by the wars of 2020 and 2023. The program advocates the recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the conclusion of comprehensive peace agreements with Azerbaijan and normalization of relations with Türkiye, constitutional reform where necessary, and the diversification of Armenia's foreign policy through reduced dependence on Russia and closer political and economic cooperation with the European Union and the United States. Whether "Real Armenia" amounts to a coherent long-term doctrine or is better understood, at least in part, as an electoral repackaging of Armenia's post-defeat adaptation is arguably still an open question, particularly given that Civil Contract's vote share has now fallen below fifty percent.

The principal challenger was the Strong Armenia alliance, backed by Russian-Armenian businessperson Samvel Karapetyan. Karapetyan's political role has generated controversy because of his close business connections with Russia. Karapetyan's Russian and Cypriot citizenships prevent him from serving as a member of parliament under Armenian law. The alliance therefore campaigned under the leadership of his nephew, Narek Karapetyan, who was also charged with failing to disclose his Russian citizenship.

Samvel Karapetyan is currently under house arrest on charges including incitement to overthrow the constitutional order, money laundering and tax evasion. Strong Armenia advocated closer strategic cooperation with Russia while simultaneously arguing that Armenia should maintain constructive relations with both the United States and the European Union. The alliance criticized the government's handling of national security and its approach toward Azerbaijan. It ultimately received 23.3 percent of the vote and secured 29 seats, establishing itself as the principal opposition force in the new parliament.

The Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, suffered a significant electoral setback. Kocharyan, who served as Armenia's president between 1998 and 2008, has remained one of Pashinyan's most prominent political rivals since the 2018 Velvet Revolution. After returning to frontline politics, his alliance won 21.1 percent of the vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections and became the main opposition bloc. In the 2026 election, however, its support declined sharply to 9.94 percent, leaving it with only 12 parliamentary seats. Throughout the campaign, Kocharyan remained one of Pashinyan's most vocal critics, accusing the government of responsibility for Armenia's military defeats and advocating the restoration of closer strategic ties with Moscow.

The Prosperous Armenia Party, led by businessperson Gagik Tsarukyan, received 3.99 percent of the vote, narrowly failing to cross the four percent electoral threshold required for parliamentary representation. Shortly after the election, Tsarukyan was charged with tax evasion.

Peace Processes with Azerbaijan and Türkiye

Although Civil Contract retained its parliamentary majority, it fell short of the constitutional majority required to unilaterally amend the constitution or initiate a constitutional referendum. This has important implications for Armenia's peace negotiations with Azerbaijan.

One of Azerbaijan's principal demands is that Armenia amend constitutional provisions which Baku interprets as implying territorial claims against Azerbaijan before a comprehensive peace treaty can be signed. The Armenian government rejects this interpretation but has nevertheless acknowledged that constitutional reform is under discussion. Should the government decide to pursue constitutional amendments, Pashinyan would likely need broader political support in parliament and, depending on the scope of the reforms, may ultimately seek approval through a national referendum. Even if such a referendum were held, however, public approval would be far from guaranteed given the sensitivity of the issue and the continuing emotional impact of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The normalization process with Türkiye remains closely linked to Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. Ankara has consistently maintained that full normalization and the opening of the Armenia–Türkiye border depend largely on progress in the peace process between Yerevan and Baku. Consequently, despite a series of confidence-building measures and technical negotiations in recent years, a comprehensive breakthrough has remained elusive.

Nevertheless, Armenian officials have increasingly argued that Türkiye should proceed with opening the border independently of constitutional discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In recent months, the two sides have continued technical discussions and steps on border infrastructure, customs procedures and transport links.

Pashinyan's weakened parliamentary mandate raises a question for Ankara's own calculus: does the sub-50 percent result strengthen the case for decoupling the border opening from Armenia's constitutional track? This could push Ankara and Baku toward incremental, connectivity-first steps rather than waiting for a treaty to be signed. So far, Turkish officials appear to have read the outcome as a mandate for continued normalization rather than as a sign of a weakened partner. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated Pashinyan on the Civil Contract victory and expressed confidence in his "vision for establishing peace." Whether that reading holds if Pashinyan's domestic position weakens further, however, remains an open question.

From Dependence to Diversification

For much of the post-Soviet period, Armenia represented Russia's closest strategic partner in the South Caucasus. Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, which gradually distanced themselves from Russian-led security structures, Armenia remained firmly embedded within Moscow's regional security architecture. Its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri, Russian border guards stationed along Armenia's frontiers with Türkiye and Iran, and extensive economic ties all reinforced Russia's position as Armenia's principal security guarantor.

The central reason for this relationship was the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia's military confrontation with Azerbaijan left successive governments with few realistic alternatives to Russian security guarantees. Although concerns over excessive dependence on Moscow periodically surfaced in Armenian political discourse, they were generally overshadowed by the perception that Russia remained indispensable for Armenia's national security.

Nevertheless, that assumption was fundamentally challenged by the events of 2020–2023. During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia did not receive the level of political or military support that many Armenians had expected from Russia. Following the ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh, yet they ultimately failed to prevent Azerbaijan from establishing full control over the region in 2023.

These developments significantly eroded public confidence in Russia as Armenia's primary security guarantor. More importantly, they transformed the strategic thinking of Armenia's political leadership. The country's long-standing security doctrine had been built upon the assumption that Russia would provide the ultimate guarantee against existential threats. The collapse of this assumption encouraged Yerevan to pursue a policy aimed not at replacing Russia with another patron, but at reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence on any single external power.

This policy of strategic diversification has already produced tangible changes. Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO, substantially reduced the role of Russian border guards, and transferred responsibility for several border crossings back to Armenian authorities. Simultaneously, Yerevan has expanded defense cooperation with a broader range of partners while pursuing more active engagement with both the European Union and the United States.

Diversification is closely connected to Armenia's efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. For decades, Armenia's closed borders with its two largest neighbors limited its economic opportunities and reinforced its dependence on routes and partnerships linked to Russia and Georgia. A comprehensive regional peace settlement would fundamentally alter this geopolitical reality by opening new transport routes, expanding access to international markets, attracting foreign investment and reducing Armenia's strategic isolation.

An important component of this broader strategy is the TRIPP Framework Agreement signed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in May 2026. Under the agreement, a TRIPP Development Company would be established to finance, develop and operate railway, highway, energy and digital infrastructure associated with the project. During the initial forty-nine-year period, the United States would hold a 74 percent ownership stake, while Armenia would retain the remaining 26 percent. Should the agreement subsequently be extended for an additional fifty years, Armenia's share would increase to 49 percent. The framework also seeks to address one of Armenia's principal political concerns by explicitly reaffirming Armenian sovereignty over all territory covered by the project.

Armenia's efforts to diversify its foreign policy have been accompanied by a significant expansion of relations with the European Union. The implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has accelerated cooperation in areas including judicial reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures, digital transformation, energy diversification and economic modernization. Following the deployment of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), Brussels has assumed a more visible role in supporting stability along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

Against this background, Armenia hosted the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan on May 4, 2026. Armenian officials have increasingly expressed interest in deepening institutional ties with the European Union although full membership remains a distant prospect and is not currently on the political agenda in Brussels. Nevertheless, closer integration has become an increasingly important component of Armenia's long-term development strategy.

Growing Tensions with Russia

Armenia's diversification strategy has inevitably generated tensions with Moscow. From the Russian perspective, the South Caucasus remains part of its traditional sphere of influence, and Armenia has historically occupied a central place within Russia's regional security architecture. Consequently, Yerevan's expanding cooperation with other partners is likely to be viewed not merely as a foreign policy adjustment but as a gradual erosion of Russian influence.

Observers allege that the June 2026 election was subject to sustained covert Russian efforts to undermine Pashinyan and to support pro-Russian candidates, including disinformation campaigns directed at the electorate. Russia imposed restrictions on imports of Armenian goods. Russia continues to possess significant instruments of leverage over Armenia as one of Armenia's largest trading partners and an important destination for Armenian exports. Remittances from Armenians working in Russia continue to play a substantial role in the Armenian economy, while Russian companies maintain an important presence in sectors such as energy, natural gas and electricity distribution. These economic links provide Moscow with considerable capacity to exert pressure should bilateral relations deteriorate further.

Russia also retains an important military presence in Armenia through its base at Gyumri. As a result, Armenia faces the difficult task of reducing its dependence on Russia without creating new vulnerabilities before alternative partnerships have fully matured.

Political competition for influence is also likely to intensify. Moscow has traditionally maintained close relationships with a range of Armenian political and economic actors, many of whom have openly criticized Pashinyan's foreign policy. As Armenia continues to deepen cooperation with other partners, Russia may seek to strengthen these relationships in an effort to preserve its influence over Armenian domestic politics.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has paid a political price for Armenia's military defeats in 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Public confidence in his leadership has declined compared with the overwhelming support he enjoyed following the Velvet Revolution. Nevertheless, the 2026 parliamentary elections demonstrated that no opposition force has yet succeeded in presenting a sufficiently credible alternative. While his electoral mandate has weakened, Pashinyan remains the dominant figure in Armenian politics.

His government cannot reverse the territorial and political consequences of the wars with Azerbaijan. Instead, it is attempting to construct a new strategic vision for Armenia based on regional normalization, economic connectivity and a more diversified foreign policy. In this sense, the concept of "Real Armenia" represents an effort to redefine the country's future in light of irreversible geopolitical changes rather than to restore the status quo that existed before 2020.

For this reason, describing Armenia's foreign policy simply as a choice between Russia and the West is increasingly misleading. Such a binary framework fails to capture the constraints under which Armenian policymakers operate. For much of the post-Soviet period, Armenia's close relationship with Russia reflected strategic necessity rather than ideological preference. Although concerns regarding excessive dependence on Moscow were widely recognized, few viable alternatives existed.

Today, those alternatives are gradually emerging. Cooperation with the European Union has expanded, the United States has assumed a more visible role through initiatives such as TRIPP, and the normalization processes with Azerbaijan and Türkiye offer the prospect of reducing Armenia's long-standing regional isolation. Yet these developments should not be interpreted as evidence that Armenia is replacing one geopolitical patron with another. Rather, they reflect an effort to create multiple partnerships capable of reducing the vulnerabilities associated with dependence on a single external actor.

Whether this strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain. Armenia's economic and security ties with Russia remain extensive, and Moscow is unlikely to accept a gradual reduction of its influence without attempting to protect its interests. At the same time, neither the United States nor the European Union appears willing to provide security guarantees comparable to those that Russia once claimed to offer. Consequently, Armenia is likely to remain engaged in a delicate balancing strategy for the foreseeable future. In this respect, the willingness of the United States and the European Union to sustain long-term political, economic and institutional engagement with Armenia may prove just as important as Armenia's own domestic reforms in determining whether this strategy can succeed. In such a context, Türkiye should consider taking concrete steps for opening borders.

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Pınar Sayan is an Associate Professor and Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Beykoz University. Her research focuses on ethnicity and nationalism in European politics, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation. She has held visiting research positions at the University of Cambridge, Stockholm University, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, and the Georg Eckert Institute. She previously worked as a Research Fellow at IstanPol and as Turkey Director of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation.

IstanPol thanks Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Türkiye Office for their contribution to this project. The views stated in this paper belong to the author and need not agree, partly or entirely, with the institutional views of IstanPol or Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.