The study titled “A New Era in the Kurdish Issue: Public Perceptions and Attitudes in Türkiye”, jointly conducted by IstanPol and Rawest Research, was presented to civil society organizations, media representatives, and researchers at a meeting held in Istanbul on June 23, 2025.

The research was conducted between May 13–23, 2025, through CATI survey with 2,010 participants across 21 provinces and 56 districts. The sample was stratified by age, gender, education level, and 2023 voting preferences to ensure national representativeness. The findings are statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, with a margin of error of ±2 percentage points.

* This research was conducted with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Turkey Representation. Please click here to access the full report.

The March 19 Crackdown

The cancellation of İmamoğlu’s diploma, his subsequent arrest, and the initiation of legal proceedings against CHP-run municipalities since March 19 have led to a redefinition of the political landscape in Türkiye. According to the findings, these developments have caused sharp polarization in society. Fewer than one in three respondents believe the diploma cancellation and arrest were justified, while 46% think İmamoğlu was targeted due to his strong chances of winning the presidential election. Nearly two-thirds of People’s Alliance voters (AKP and MHP) support the crackdown, whereas strong opposition is observed among CHP and DEM Party voters.

The Kurdish Question

The existence of a Kurdish issue—or the perception that “Kurds face problems”—is widely acknowledged. While 41% of ethnic Turks agree there is a Kurdish issue, this figure rises to 60% among Kurds. Additionally, 29% of all respondents believe that Kurds and Turks are not treated equally by the state, a view held by nearly half of Kurdish respondents.

When asked who is capable of resolving the Kurdish issue, 40% of respondents name the Erdoğan–Bahçeli duo. Among Kurds, Selahattin Demirtaş is the second most frequently cited figure, while İmamoğlu and Özgür Özel follow among Turks and other groups. Support for Mansur Yavaş on this issue comes almost exclusively from Turks.

The New Kurdish Resolution Process

One of the most notable findings of the study is the increasing public support for the  “new resolution process” called “Terror-free Türkiye Initiative” initiated in October 2024. In October 2024, support stood at around 45–46%, rising to nearly two-thirds by May 2025. Among Kurds, the increase was sharp and steady—from 35% to 55%, then to 65%, and eventually exceeding 80%. Among Turks and other groups, support rose from 38% to 43%, then to 55%, and finally to 60%.

Support is highest among DEM Party voters. Half of CHP voters are supportive, while the remainder are either undecided or unsupportive. The highest level of opposition is observed among İYİ Party voters. One-quarter of MHP voters and one-sixth of AKP voters also report not supporting the process.

While 64% of participants support the process, only 42% believe it is progressing successfully. Among AKP voters, this figure exceeds 50%, but it remains below that threshold among all other voter groups. Nearly 60% of respondents believe the process is contributing positively to national security and is beneficial for both Kurds and Turks. There is also a strong perception that the process benefits both the AKP and the DEM Party.

As for the government’s motivations, respondents most frequently cite the aim of securing Erdoğan’s continuation in power through constitutional change, followed by a desire to establish equality between Kurds and Turks. While 30% believe the process is intended to prevent Kurdish gains in the Middle East, 49% disagree with this view.

Belief in the PKK’s disarmament remains limited. Two-thirds of Kurdish respondents think the organization will lay down arms, but one in four do not. Among Turks, 42% believe the PKK will disarm.

CHP and the Resolution Process

Perceptions of whether the resolution process benefits political parties vary across groups. Two-thirds of Kurds and nearly half of Turks and others believe the process favors the AKP and DEM Party. However, there is no clear consensus on its impact on the CHP. Among Kurds, more respondents believe the process benefits the CHP, whereas this view is weaker among Turks and others. While AKP and DEM Party voters generally evaluate the process positively, CHP voters remain more ambivalent.

Three-quarters of Kurds and 85% of DEM Party voters believe that CHP’s involvement in the process is important. The idea of cooperation between the CHP and the DEM Party is supported by 57% of CHP voters and 67% of DEM Party voters. Despite this support, half of all respondents believe the CHP does not have a clear policy on the Kurdish issue.

Public Demands

The public demands raised during the process fall into three main categories: mother tongue rights, the situation of prisoners and returnees, and local development.

The idea of promoting economic development in Kurdish-majority regions and strengthening local administrations across Türkiye enjoys strong support—69% and nearly two-thirds, respectively. The use of Kurdish alongside Turkish in municipal services is viewed positively by 60% of respondents.

Support for the release of Selahattin Demirtaş is high among Kurdish respondents, while it remains at around one-third among Turks.

Consistent with earlier research, the most prominent demand among Kurdish respondents is for mother tongue rights. Support for bilingual education surpasses opposition. Among Turks and other groups, support for Kurdish-language education rises significantly when it is tied to the condition that the PKK lays down arms.