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POLICY PAPER

IS IT TIME TO  
NEGOTIATE  
A COMPLEMENTARY  
FRAMEWORK  
FOR TURKEY-EU  
RELATIONS?

AN INSTITUTIONAL LOOK FOR 2019-2024

DR. İLKE TOYGÜR

JANUARY 2020 - 002

HEINRICH  
BÖLL  
STIFTUNG  
DERNEĞİ TÜRKİYE  
TEMSİLCİLİĞİ

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# CONTENTS

## **Executive Summary**

- 5 -

## **I. Introduction**

- 6 -

## **II. Historical Background**

- 8 -

## **III. Institutional responses to the current stalemate**

- 10 -

## **IV. Policy implications: Keeping the fragile status quo or looking for a reshaping of relations?**

- 16 -

## **V. Conclusion**

- 18 -

**4**

IS IT TIME TO NEGOTIATE A COMPLEMENTARY FRAMEWORK FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS?

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**For years, Turkey and the European Union settled into a very fragile status quo.<sup>1</sup> Even if the relationship proved itself more resilient than many expected, the current framework -Turkey being a candidate state for accession- does not lead to mutual trust and rules-based cooperation in all dimensions.**

The need for a reframing is already underlined by many, not necessarily to substitute accession negotiations, but to complement it. However, the most important ingredient for a reframing is the political will on both sides. The lack of it has been contributing to the stalemate. Both sides try to use the remaining leverage(s) to get better treatment, while deepening mutual distrust. The new institutional cycle could be taken as an opportunity to invest in a rules-based hybrid approach – keeping accession negotiations aside for brighter days in the

future while trying to build a functioning complementary framework. To achieve this, three core institutions –the leadership of European Council, European Parliament and the Commission– should be involved in the debate in addition to member states. Institutions matter and their involvement in the process will decrease the politicization of the issue. This paper looks at EU institutions for the legislation that has just started, to judge whether the much-needed ground for re-railing the relationship can be found.

# I. INTRODUCTION

Far beyond the European Union as a supranational institution, Turkey has always been an integral part of European history. There are not only political ties but also economic, social and cultural links that oblige all sides to invest in a functioning relationship. Having said that, Turkey is the country that has been waiting the longest at the doorsteps of the European Union.

Today membership talks are *dysfunctional* and the relationship is mostly shaped with a discourse of crisis. Still, the interdependency between the sides has been so obvious and the existence of an accession framework –instead of an undefined “strategic partnership”– has been more politically convenient. For this reason, a dramatic rupture has so far been avoided.

However, the current state of affairs is not accommodative to the resolution for the complex problems arising in a changing and increasingly challenging world. It is not just that the European Union has lost its transformative power over Turkey, it is also left without tools when it comes to much needed cooperation in various areas. The new presidential system in Turkey also left them without interlocutors. Many scholars<sup>2</sup> have already argued that a *complementary framework* is needed to reframe relations. Even if the common agreement is to keep the accession negotiations aside for brighter days of the future,<sup>3</sup> looking for a rules-based complementary framework in the meantime is widely encouraged. This framework should provide the platform to discuss and act together in various ar-

eas, including the economy, migration management, security and more.

So what is needed to establish a rules-based hybrid approach that is maintaining the prospect of accession negotiations while developing a functioning complementary framework? In addition to political will, interlocutors and platforms for dialogue are also needed. With the current political environment, a first step will

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***Today membership talks are dysfunctional and the relationship is mostly shaped with a discourse of crisis.***

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actually be not to move ahead but increase the dialogue to undo some of the measures that have already been taken. During the new term in the European Union, there will be discussions on the continuation of accession negotiations, the upgrading of the Customs Union and visa liberalization. Turkey still will be a key player in two of the most important issues for the European Union: security and migration – meaning many will call the nation as a *strategic partner*. Turkey's more independent foreign policy and its consequences will be on the agenda. The same is true for sanctions. Ankara's role in NATO and its contested relations with Moscow and Tehran will be discussed over and over. The recent developments in Syria and Libya showed us the European Union is exposed to a neighbor that is more and more assertive in its foreign policy decisions. Meanwhile, the tools available for a persuasive engagement<sup>4</sup> are very limited. For the years to come, the new institutional cycle of the Union, together with bilateral rela-

tions with member states, will define the color and the tone of Turkey-EU relations.

Every new term in the Union brings fresh hope. This paper aims to untangle the institutional setup the Union has agreed upon for 2019-2024 to see if the much-needed **political will** might be found. The institutional view on Turkey-EU relations may overcome the simplification of the multifaceted project as being directed by one voice. Perceiving the Union as one actor is a common mistake of many in Turkey since the institutional structure and the current balance of power are not well studied. This paper will continue with a brief history of bilateral relations. Then it will introduce the new face of each institution with a special focus on their possible approach towards Turkey. The paper will end by laying out policy recommendations for decision-makers and a short conclusion.

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***Turkey still will be a key player in two of the most important issues for the European Union: security and migration – meaning many will call the nation as a strategic partner.***

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## II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkey's relationship with the European Union dates way back in history. In 1963 the European Economic Community (EEC) –the predecessor of the European Union– signed an Association Agreement with Turkey, known as the Ankara Agreement. The Ankara Agreement is accepted as the legal foundation of Turkey-EU relations.<sup>5</sup> Even if the agreement did not explicitly promise membership to the Union, it left the door open. It initiated financial assistance to Turkey to help its economic development. Back then, the core dynamic of the relationship was economic integration.

Even if Turkey was tied to Western institutions, turbulence in Turkey –and also in Europe– kept the relationship from progressing. The military interventions of 1960 (coup attempt), 1971 (memorandum) and 1980 (coup attempt), and the democratic deficit caused by them had severe implications. It is important to underline that the conceptualization of the Copenhagen criteria in the European Council of June 1993, introducing political conditionality and economic regulation,<sup>6</sup> brought the discussion into conflicted territory for Turkish administration. Since Turkish democracy has never been a consolidated liberal democracy and has witnessed regular military interventions, it lacked the necessary institutional capacity to move forward. Turkey applied for full membership in 1987<sup>7</sup> even if it was not declared eligible to join the Union until 1997.

In the meantime, the Customs Union agreement entered into force in December 1995. It was not only a free trade agreement. It was also an opportunity to align Turkish legislation with Community regulations on internal markets. It was perceived as a first step towards membership and welcomed by many.

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*The migration crisis  
in 2015 gave the  
relationship a new pace.*

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Turkey became a candidate country in 1999 in the European Council of Helsinki. The *EU anchor*, the possibility to become a member, or even getting closer to the club, was quite positive for reforms in Turkey in the beginning. The most important example of Turkey's will to start meeting the Copenhagen Criteria was the abolition of the death penalty. For a while,

Turkish government(s) kept reforms coming. In October 2004, the European Commission stated Turkey fulfilled the political criteria and recommended the starting of accession negotiations. In the meantime, a non-unified Cyprus became an EU member after the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan for unification while Turkish Cypriots accepted it. This in fact introduced one of the most important obstacles for Turkish accession.

In 2005 the negotiations have started while from the very beginning it was stated that “the negotiations will be open-ended and they would not guarantee membership.” A year later, in December 2006, the Council decided “eight chapters could not be opened and that

none could be closed until Turkey accepted a full and non-discriminatory compliance with the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement.” Afterwards, Cyprus and France also added some more chapters to the black list. Even the most technical part of the negotiations got political right from the beginning. In 2013, Gezi Park protests and their aftermath caused further criticism and alienation of the Turkish government regarding the reforms needed for accession. It can be taken as the breaking point of an-already-troubled affair.

The migration crisis in 2015 gave the relationship a new pace. Turkey and the European Council reached an agreement aiming to stop irregular migration to Europe via Turkey on 18<sup>th</sup> of March 2016.<sup>8</sup> With this excuse, negotiations on visa liberalization were also intensified. A roadmap that included 72 benchmarks to fulfill before a visa-free regime could be introduced was given to Turkey.<sup>9</sup> Today, Turkey is still missing 5 out of 72 benchmarks, meaning there have been no improvements regarding this issue. The transactional positive wind didn’t last long. Today, refugees in Turkey are frequently used as leverage over the European Union. The Union, on the other hand, is in desperate need of designing a new migration policy, which should involve a close dialogue with Turkey.

After the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the measures that are taken by the Turkish government brought this discussion to a new level. Since then, Turkey’s backsliding in the areas such as rule of law, basic rights and freedoms and functioning of judiciary has been at the center of criticism. Even Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria is questioned.<sup>10</sup> According

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*The new institutional cycle should be taken as an opportunity for going out from this stalemate and formulating a new –and functioning– relationship.*

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to Council conclusions of 26 June 2018, “Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union and that accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.”<sup>11</sup>

Taking all this into consideration, a first step is not actually to move ahead but to undo measures that have been taken. There is no point to play a blame game; both sides are responsible for the current situation. The need for an institutionalized dialogue is obvious given the interdependency between the sides. This paper suggests that, the new institutional cycle should be taken as an opportunity for going out from this stalemate and formulating a new –and functioning– relationship.

## III. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CURRENT STALEMATE

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2019, the European Commission took office.<sup>12</sup> With this, a new term, which will last until 2024, has officially begun in the European Union. The following subsections dismantle the institutions. It is important to keep in mind that Turkey-EU relations are not necessarily independent from the rest of the dynamics of the Union. More attention to these dynamics should be given to adjust expectations and to work towards more achievable goals.

### III.I. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: A KEY PLAYER FROM ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS TO MODERNIZATION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION

When we talk about the European Commission, there is the College of Commissioners –the political leadership– on the one hand while the administrative Commission on the other. The commissioners – and their political affiliations, strengths and weaknesses, matter.


On the political leadership side, Ursula von der Leyen, the President-elect of the European Commission, appointed Olivér Várhelyi as the commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement.<sup>13</sup> With his approval, someone close to Victor Orbán will be overseeing this portfolio. How could this be interpreted? Prime Minister Orbán and President Erdoğan share many illiberal aspirations and get along. However, this does not change the fact the Hungarian PM is against Turkey's membership. In his Hearings in the European Parliament, Olivér Várhelyi once again called Turkey a **strategic partner** separated from the Western Balkans,

while underlining the importance of Turkey. He thinks every country should be judged separately for its path to membership. It is important to keep in mind that the College of Commissioners tend to agree on important decisions before initiating any legislation, and since Turkey is an important issue on various dimensions, other members of the College will also have an intense relationship with Turkey.

In addition to the already mentioned Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, the person who will lead foreign policy is Josep Borrell. Even if foreign policy is a member state competence and member states call the shots, he will have an important role to play. This time the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy comes from a country, Spain, that has good relations with Turkey. In addition, within the Cabinet of the HRVP there are people that know the dossier of Turkey very well. This situation could be converted into an advantage for fostering good relations.

On the administrative side, the European Commission has been publishing annual reports on Turkey for

**FIGURE 1:** College of Commissioners



Source: Designed by IstanPol with information from the European Commission

two decades. The 2019 report is the 21<sup>st</sup> since 1998. As the institution that follows accession negotiations and candidate states' progress, its technical assessment is an important tool to evaluate the current situation. In its 2019 report (which covers the period from 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2018 to 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2019), the Commission raises very serious concerns on the rule of law, the state of democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms.<sup>14</sup> The tone of the report is very similar to previous ones. Since the coup attempt on July 15<sup>th</sup> 2016, reports focus on very similar angles. For this reason, the latest ones have been heavily criticized by the Turkish government.<sup>15</sup> The Turkish side questions how "sincere

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*The European Commission is also crucially important for Customs Union modernization.*

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
and constructive” the report is while underlining it reflects the allegations of “certain circles.” Since this is the case, the reports do not serve its aim.

The European Commission is also crucially important for Customs Union modernization. It already proposed to modernize it in December 2016 and asked the Council for the mandate.<sup>16</sup> Following the positive wind of the Turkey-EU Statement of March 2016, the Commission suggested to focus on an area where joint interests were identified. However, the negotiations did not move further and still await the Council’s mandate.

### III.II. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: THE WILL OF CITIZENS OR POLITICIZATION?

After the elections in May 2019, the European Parliament, the only directly elected institution of the Union, has a different composition compared to previous legislations. For the first time, European People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists and Democrats (S&D) groups together do not have the majority. This means that for any issue on the table, the formation of consensus will require more political groups to be involved. This will make the Turkey file even more vulnerable

**FIGURE 2:** Composition of the European Parliament



*Source: Designed by Istanbul with information from the European Parliament*

and also open to further politicization. The following figure represents the current distribution.

Turkish decision-makers and civil society should start establishing relations with all these political groups. Many will share the criticism on the state of rule of law and basic rights in Turkey. The European Parliament has been the most critical institution so far. It has been witnessing many heated debates on the current state of affairs in its premises. It is important to know that once the country report is out of European Commission, it comes to the European Parliament for amendments and ratification. In this process, all groups will have their say.

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***Sánchez is a figure that knows Turkey well since he has been an electoral observer in this country's elections for OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and led various electoral missions in the country.***

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For this cycle, Ignacio Sánchez Amor, a Spanish MEP from the Socialists and Democrats group is the Turkey rapporteur and he will be responsible of the preparation of the report. Sánchez is a figure that knows Turkey well since he has been an electoral observer in this country's elections for OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and led various electoral missions in the country.<sup>17</sup> Taking over the task from Kati Piri, the Dutch MEP from the same group, he aims to contribute to the debate and improve the current situation. He will officially be visiting Turkey for the first time as the rapporteur in January 2020. He will look for a consensus that could make

this house an actor that contributes to the reframing of the relations.

It is important to underline that the European Parliament has a legislative role on files such as visa liberalization. So improving relations with this institution in addition to member states could have a direct impact on potentially unlocking important dossiers for Turkey. However, when the latest resolutions of the institution are checked,<sup>18</sup> it is very clear that Turkey's moves in various areas – be it the military operation in north-east Syria or the removal of elected mayors – create a strong push back. In the latest resolution in October 2019, the European Parliament calls on the Council to adopt “appropriate and targeted economic measures against Turkey ... and as a last resort the suspension of EU-Turkey customs union.”<sup>19</sup> Most of the statements of this institution are not binding and are just recommendations for the Council. However, the pressure on other institutions has been mounting. Taking all this into consideration, Turkish authorities and civil society should invest in their relationship with the European Parliament and its political groups.


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### **III.III. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EU: MEMBER STATES OR INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS?**

The European Council,<sup>20</sup> whose current president is Charles Michel, is the institution responsible for providing the European Union with a general direction. It consists of the heads of states and governments of the member states. The institution plays a key role in decisions related to enlargement. Member states that have complicated bilateral relations with Ankara, the ones with massive Turkish (or Kurdish) diaspora, with deepened security interests or dependency on migration, play their hands also in the Council. It is crucial for Turkish authorities to improve bilateral relations with member states taking into consideration their sensitivities.

Germany, France and the Netherlands are striking examples in which Turkey is a domestic policy issue because of the size of their Turkish (or Kurdish) diaspora. Keeping that aside, France is also heavily invested on

**FIGURE 3:** Composition of the European Council



Source: Designed by IstanPol with information from the European Council.

intelligence sharing and cooperation on foreign fighters with Turkey. Denmark and Austria, on the other hand, share a long-standing skepticism and their stance on Turkey has been rather historical.

Greece and Cyprus are two countries that are very much affected by Turkey's foreign policy decisions. The Cyprus issue has been an obstacle to Turkey's accession from the very beginning. Today, the country is in the spotlight when it comes to hydrocarbon developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and all the issues that surround it. On the other hand, Turkey has been Greece's greatest foreign policy matter. For this reason, it supports Turkey's EU membership since the existence of the candidacy process provides a protective shield. However, lately Turkey has been more unilateral in its foreign policy moves while relying on ad-hoc alliances rather than historical partnerships.<sup>21</sup> This situation decreases the value of the protective shield.

It is important to note that a decrease in Turkey-European Union engagement leads to an increase in bilateralism. The leaders of the countries that are heavily invested in Turkey -Germany, France and the United Kingdom- tend to lead the way in foreign policy. However, Charles Michel's – and the institution's – involvement would also give a supranational touch to the de-

bate and decrease the personalization of Turkey dossier. For this to happen, *petit comité* meetings with Turkish officials, such as the quadrilateral one on the sidelines of the most recent NATO summit, should be limited while the institutionalization is encouraged. Bilateral relations are crucial, however, it should not jeopardize the EU's leverage.

In addition to the European Council –the leadership side of the story,– the Council of the EU as the legislative body of the Union has its own dynamics. For example, in 2018 the accession negotiations with Turkey were frozen by the General Affairs Council as a response to the violation of fundamental rights. In July 2019, the Council adopted conclusions and decided “to suspend negotiations on the Comprehensive Air

Transport Agreement and not to hold the Association Council and further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level dialogues for the time being.”<sup>22</sup> Following that, the Foreign Affairs Council decided in November 2019 on an established sanctions framework for “individuals and entities responsible for or involved in unauthorized drilling activities of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean.”<sup>23</sup> It also endorsed the Commission's proposal to reduce pre-accession funds for Turkey. All these demonstrate the severity of the situation and the need for resetting the relationship.

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***A decrease in Turkey-European Union engagement leads to an increase in bilateralism.***

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## IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: KEEPING THE FRAGILE STATUS QUO OR LOOKING FOR A RESHAPING OF RELATIONS?

Taking all this into consideration, European and Turkish leaders have a choice. During this cycle, they can either look for a *complementary rules-based functioning framework* or stick with the *fragile status quo*. This paper recommends moving towards that framework. To establish it, different institutions, political groups and EU officials should be re-engaged into debate and the links between the two sides should be re-established. It is clear that the presidential system in Turkey also weakened the role of interlocutors. For this reason, an effort on both sides should be put into increasing the dialogue by means of institutions. To this end, policy recommendations are given below:

Policy recommendations for both sides of the equilibrium:

- Since one of the core problems is mutual trust, statements demonstrating awareness of the importance of the relationship should be given frequently. All sides need reassurance.
- Following the point given above, both sides should not use the relationship for political gain in the domestic arena. Words matter.
- Institutions matter. Both sides should put effort into institutionalizing the relationship.

Policy recommendations for Turkish side:

- The core issue that undervalues Turkey is the current situation with regard to rule of law, basic rights and principles in Turkey. The government should start the normalization process and prove that the country still fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria.
- The European Union tends to study the internal dynamics of candidate countries quite closely. Turkey is no exception. This should be reciprocal. The Turkish administration, decision-makers and scholars should also pay attention to the internal dynamics of the Union. It is important to take into consideration that Turkey-EU relations are not independent from the internal dynamics of the EU.

- The debate on the future of the enlargement process should be kept in sight. President Macron's attitude in the European Council in October 2019 towards the enlargement process led to a non-decision on the opening of accession talks with Albania and Northern Macedonia. Frustrating many, this decision demonstrated that there will be hurdles even for the Western Balkans. France already published a non-paper to discuss the future of enlargement policy and to revise it (drastically).<sup>24</sup>
- Turkish actors should establish contacts with decision-makers on different levels so they can have fruitful dialogue. Political groups in the European Parliament or cabinet members of the Commissioners are no exception.
- In addition to official relations with the Turkish government, Turkish civil society, local governments and opposition parties should engage with their European counterparts. Right now it is hard to remember when was the last time Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party, visited Brussels.
- Unilateral acts of Turkey – such as the incursion into Syria or recently signed Memorandum of Understanding with Libya that sets the maritime boundaries – have been quite problematic for the European Union. Turkish actors should coordinate and cooperate with their European counterparts in matters of mutual interest.

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***The Turkish  
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Policy recommendations for the European side(s):

- Relations with Turkey are mostly shaped by a Franco-German attitude with the participation of a handful states. For a more European approach, the opinions of different member states should be taken into consideration.
- Following the same line, countries with less historical baggage and no public opinion to shape on Turkey at home could lead the debate for a while, so that the level of politicization will decrease.
- The European Union should coordinate further with the United States on its policies towards Turkey. If the Western allies can be united, they will have a stronger hand.<sup>25</sup>
- The drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean not only present a challenge, they also present an opportunity. The European Union should incentivize a deal to end the decades old dispute in Cyprus. The current sanctions do not necessarily serve a solution.
- The European Union should immediately start working on a common migration and asylum policy reform. This process should also include Turkey and should create a fair solution for all sides included. Otherwise, it will continue to be one of the primary tools of leverage for the Turkish government.
- The European Union should focus on issues that can be transformative in Turkish society. The priorities of the new Commission should be introduced as issue items into the agenda with Turkey.

## V. CONCLUSION

**In the cold war period, Turkey's alliance with the West was perceived as vital. Turkey was named as an existential partner against the threat of the Soviet Union because of its location. Its membership to Western institutions, such as the Council of Europe (since 1950), NATO (since 1952) and the OECD (since 1961), is a result of this perception. This picture was in line with Mustafa Kemal's thinking – that anchoring the country to the West was an essential step for economic development and social advancement. So throughout the decades, the West has been the synonym of modernization and democratization for Turkey. EU membership was taken as an ultimate goal.**

Today, Turkey's relationship with the Union is in a complete deadlock. The accession negotiations framework is not functioning. Turkey has its issues not only with individual member states but also with the political leadership of EU institutions. These problems are magnified when we factor in the internal dynamics of the Union. This paper aims to shed a light on these dynamics while drawing a picture of each institution for readers in Turkey. It presents the internal structure of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the (European) Council with a specific focus on their approach to issues with Turkey. These dynamics should be understood for a smooth relationship regarding foreign policy.

Today, the Turkish government is in favor of a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Following the trend in the

world, it undervalues multilateralism and does not shy away from unilateral moves and ad-hoc alliances. This is also a result of the transactional relationship with Europe. The lack of a rules-based functioning framework beyond the accession negotiations led to a transactional relationship. There is a very striking dilemma here: Turkey is crucially important for the EU's security dynamics and the migration debate, yet the EU enjoys so little leverage over the country. In addition, the problems have accumulated between the two-sides and none have been resolved. Taking all this into consideration, both sides should take the new legislation as an opportunity to reestablish the relationship. There are many alternative pathways ahead.<sup>26</sup> The question is which one will be chosen.

# ENDNOTES

- 1** The author would like to thank Victoria Hohenlohe for her research assistance and Seda Gürkan, Marc Pierini, Edgar Şar, Kristian Brakel and other colleagues from European institutions for their valuable feedback.
- 2** For more scenarios on the future of Turkey-EU relations, please visit the project webpage of FEUTURE, <http://www.feuture.eu/>. Starting accession negotiations require unanimity in the European Council. EUTURE, mission should be included in the debate. rmal
- 3** Opening accession negotiations require unanimity in the European Council. Many argue that this achievement should be kept aside and the much needed framework for a fruitful cooperation should not substitute it, but rather complement it. In the future, especially once Brexit takes place, there might be alternative forms of membership to the Union.
- 4** For more discussion on the methods of “persuasive engagement” please see: Gürkan, S. “Speaking loudly but carrying a small stick: is the EU powerless against Erdoğan?”, *The Conversation*, October 2019.
- 5** It is crucial to underline the legal foundation of the relationship is the Ankara Agreement and not the Negotiation Framework. This distinction is important while debating the possibility of ending accession negotiations. Max Hoffman and Michael Werz from the Center for American Progress have conducted detailed research on the effects of a suspension on Turkey’s EU accession process. The study can be found at: <https://www.stiftung-mercator.de/de/publikation/the-effects-of-a-suspension-of-turkeys-eu-accession-process/>
- 6** The Copenhagen Criteria established in 1993 states the three fundamental criteria:
  - Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
  - A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU;
  - The ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
- 7** The European Commission rejected the membership request in 1989, claiming, “in spite of the progress achieved since 1980, there is still a substantial development gap between Turkey and the EEC. The full text of the Commission opinion is available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf>
- 8** The details of the statement could be found at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>
- 9** Visa liberalization roadmap can be found at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160504/turkey\\_progress\\_visa\\_liberalisation\\_roadmap\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160504/turkey_progress_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_en.pdf)
- 10** Council of Europe has various reports on the current state of affairs with a special focus on the arbitrariness of the judiciary. For the country monitoring reports and statements please visit: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring/turkey>
- 11** The full text of Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and Association Process can be found at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf>

- 12** During the preparation of this paper, United Kingdom was occupying its posts in the European Council and the European Parliament, while it failed to nominate a Commissioner for the European Commission. In any case, the country will leave the EU on the 31st of January 2020 and vacant all the positions it has.
- 13** Budapest first named László Trócsányi as the Hungarian commissioner for the same portfolio. In September 2019 he has been voted out by the JURI committee in the European Parliament because of a conflict of interest.
- 14** For the full report please visit the European Commission: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-turkey-report.pdf>
- 15** The press statement of the Directorate for EU Affairs of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the latest report could be found at: [https://www.ab.gov.tr/press-statement-on-the-2019-country-report-on-turkey-by-the-european-commission\\_51671\\_en.html](https://www.ab.gov.tr/press-statement-on-the-2019-country-report-on-turkey-by-the-european-commission_51671_en.html)
- 16** For the press release of the Commission's proposal of Customs Union modernization please visit: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_4468](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_4468)
- 17** For an extended interview with the rapporteur please see Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/12/24/avrupa-parlamentosu-yeni-turkiye-raportoru-amor-turkiye-erdogan-dan-ibaret-degil-video-rop>
- 18** For a list of resolutions of European Parliament on Turkey please visit: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-tr/documents/ep-resolutions>
- 19** The resolution can be found at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0049\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0049_EN.html)
- 20** It is important to know that the European Council is the institution that gives the general direction to the Union while the Council (of the Ministers) is the EU's primary decision-making body.
- 21** For a detailed analysis of the Turkish foreign policy under the presidential system in Turkey please see: Kirişçi, Kemal & Toygür, İlke (2019), "Turkey's New Presidential System and a Changing West: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey-West Relations", Turkey Project Policy Paper No. 15, Brookings Institution
- 22** For the full text of the Council conclusions please visit: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/15/turkish-drilling-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-conclusions/>
- 23** For the full text of Foreign Affairs Council conclusions please visit: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41323/st13976-en19.pdf>
- 24** For the French non-paper please visit: <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Enlargement-nonpaper.pdf>
- 25** For a more detailed analysis of the benefits of this collaboration see: Danforth, N. & Toygür, I. (2017), "How to Dull Turkey's Autocratic Edge", Foreign Affairs.
- 26** For a good coverage of landmines and alternative pathways ahead please see: Soler i Lecha, Eduard (2019), "EU-Turkey relations: Mapping landmines and exploring alternative pathways", FEPS Policy Paper.

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